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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
THE ILLINOIS PREMISES LIABILITY ACT: A
NEW APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION
OF A LANDOWNER'S LIABILITY
Every tort case in which liability is imposed on a defendant is predicated
upon a duty: an obligation to conform to a particular standard of conduct
toward another to which the law gives recognition and effect.' The scope of
an individual's duty, reflecting the scope of the law's protection, is intimately
linked to our notions of human relations.' Thus, in theory, as social values,
policies, and understandings change, the nature of citizens' legal duties with
respect to their neighbors tends to change as well.3
Individuals are expected to conform to the legal standard of reasonable
conduct under the circumstances in their everyday activities. 4 Therefore, they
1. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 356 (5th ed. 1984) [herinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]; Green, Duties, Risks,
Causation Doctrines, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 42, 45 (1962), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION
PROCESS IN TORT LAW 215, 218 (1965). "Duty" is the question of whether the defendant is
under a legal obligation for the benefit of the plaintiff based upon their relationship to one
another.
2. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1953). This Note makes only a
brief attempt to familiarize the reader with the traditional principles of negligence theory and
their application. For a general discussion of this area of tort law, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 1, at 393-410; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 896-1161 (1956); Green,
The Negligence Action, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 372. Generally speaking, the tort of negligence
requires proof of: (1) a recognized legal duty owed by the defendant to avoid exposing the
plaintiff to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) some
injury to the plaintiff that is compensable; and (4) a causal connection between the breach of
the defendant's duty and the plaintiff's injury, usually termed "proximate cause." Illinois
Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 247, 258, 433 N.E.2d 1350, 1359
(2d Dist. 1982).
3. Professor Leon Green refers broadly to the influence of the "general environment" on
the development of the law. As Professor Green suggests, "It may be difficult to realize but
any important change in the social environment or any significant scientific invention or
discovery makes it necessary to discard or modify old law and frequently create new law."
Green, The Influence of Environment on the Litigation Process, 20 LA. L. REV. 548, 553
(1960), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 87, 92 (1965); see also
Green, supra note 2, at 370-73 (noting the response of negligence law to changes in the social
environment).
4. Duties are stated in broad terms. Theoretically, in negligence cases the duty is always
to use reasonable care under the circumstances. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases,
28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1025 (1928), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN
TORT LAW 153, 164 (1965). For example, it might be said that a person driving an automobile
has a duty to others to use reasonable care in its operation. This simply recognizes that the
law protects the interests of some persons from the driver's conduct. What interests and how
much protection, or what may specifically be required of the driver are not set out. The judge
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are expected to act reasonably, even when they opt to take no action at all.'
Yet, owners or occupiers6 of property traditionally have not been obligated
to act under this general standard of reasonable care in the use of their
property. Instead, determining the extent of an owner's duty to an entrant
who was injured on the owner's premises required that the entrant be
classified either as a trespasser, 7 licensee,8 or invitee. 9 The landowner owed
a different duty of care to each class of entrant. Landowners merely owed
trespassers the duty to refrain from wilful and wanton misconduct. The same
duty was owed to licensees, yet the owner had the additional responsibility
to warn them of known hidden dangers on the premises. To invitees, the
most favored class of entrants, the owner owed the highest duty-the duty
to use reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition."' This
was true whether the entrant was injured as a result of some condition
existing on the premises or by some affirmative act of the owner.
On September 12, 1984, the 83d Illinois General Assembly passed the
Illinois Premises Liability (Act).' The Act abolished the common law dis-
will decide whether, in a given case, the particular plaintiff has protection against the particular
defendant's conduct. Id.
The necessary complement of the concept of duty is the legal standard of care; the two are
correlative. "What the defendant must do, or must not do, is a question of the standard of
conduct required to satisfy the duty." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 356. Therefore, the
actions of one having a duty to use reasonable care will be scrutinized by asking whether the
person has conformed to the standard of reasonable conduct under the circumstances. Id. The
jury determines whether an individual defendant acted reasonably according to the facts of the
particular case.
5. Generally speaking, negligence theory is based on affirmative conduct. Negligence law
broadly proposes that "no person is under a duty to another unless he has entered upon some
course of conduct towards such other." Green, supra note 4, at 1026-27, reprinted in L. GREEN,
THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 153, 165-66 (1965). Where an individual has failed to
act there is normally no liability for negligence. But when some relation exists between the
parties or the individual has taken some prior action that creates a duty to act for the other's
protection, then the failure of a defendant to act can be unreasonable conduct. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
6. The terms "owner," "occupier," and "landowner" are used interchangeably throughout
this Note to refer to the person who has the legal right or exclusive title to the premises,
whether or not they are in possession.
7. See infra text accompanying note 24.
8. See infra text accompanying note 29.
9. See infra text accompanying note 35.
10. There are four "special relationships" which give rise to the "highest duty": (l) common
carrier-passenger; (2) innkeeper-guest; (3) business invitor-invitee; and (4) voluntary custodian-
protectee under certain circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). These
relationships give rise to a high degree of care, including the duty to act for the benefit of
another. Thus, mention is typically restricted to those cases presented with the question of
whether the defendant was under a duty to protect the victim from a criminal attack by a third
party. See, e.g., Comastro v. Village of Rosemont, 122 Ill. App. 3d 405, 461 N.E.2d 616 (1st
Dist. 1984) (patron assaulted in owner's parking lot after rock concert); Burks v. Madyun, 105
Ill. App. 3d 917, 435 N.E.2d 185 (1st Dist. 1982) (babysitter shot by intruder on owner's
premises); Krautstrunk v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 95 Ill. App. 3d 529, 420 N.E.2d 429 (1st Dist.
1981) (elevator repairman assaulted on owner's premises).
II. Premises Liability Act, Pub. Act No. 83-1398, 1984 I1. Legis. Serv. No. 6, pp. 179-80.
The Act states:
ILLINOIS PREMISES LIABILITY ACT
tinction between invitees and licensees with respect to the duty owed to such
entrants by the owners of premises. Instead, the new legislation imposes
upon owners the duty to exercise reasonable care toward these rightful
entrants. Hence, with the enactment of the Premises Liability Act, Illinois
joins the growing minority of jurisdictions that have abolished, in whole or
in part,' 2 the common law scheme of status classifications. These jurisdictions
have moved slowly toward imposing upon owners a duty of reasonable care
for the benefit of all entrants on the premises.
This Note begins with a discussion of the traditional approach to premises
liability in Illinois. Consideration is given both to the historical origins of
the common law status rules and to the numerous exceptions that have made
the law of premises liability increasingly complex and frequently confusing.
Additionally, attention is given to the recent trend in the law of premises
liability that is placing greater responsibility upon owners for the safety of
entrants on their premises. After exploring the scope and extent of the
Illinois Premises Liability Act, the focus shifts to an analysis of the strengths
and weaknesses of the Act. While the elimination of the licensee-invitee
dichotomy is viewed as a beneficial change, this Note suggests that the
legislature should have taken the opportunity to abolish the common law
distinctions in toto. Finally, this Note examines the implications of the Act
for the courts, the practitioner, and the public.
BACKGROUND
The common law established three categories of persons to whom an
owner owed a duty of care: trespassers, licensees, and invitees. The common
law rules regarding an owner's duty to these persons emerged in an era when
policies and values were far different from those of contemporary society.
Initially, the three broad categories were sharply delineated and strictly
applied. 3 As the social and economic environment changed, numerous ex-
Section 1. This Act is called and may be cited as the "Premises Liability Act."
Section 2. The distinction under the common law between invitees and licensees
as to the duty owed by an owner or occupier of any premises to such entrants is
abolished.
The duty owed to such entrants is that of reasonable care under the circumstances
regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them.
Section 3. Nothing herein affects the law as regards any category of trespasser,
including the trespassing child entrant.
Section 4. Notwithstanding this Act, the liability of any owner or occupier of a
premises to anyone who enters or uses those premises for a recreational purpose,
as defined by "An Act to limit the liability of landowners who make their land
and water area available to the public for recreational purposes", approved August
2, 1965, as now or hereafter amended, is governed by that Act.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 80-108.
13. "What I particularly wish to emphasize is that there are the three different classes-
invitees, licensee, trespassers . . . . Now the line that separates each of these three classes is an
absolutely rigid line. There is no half-way house, no no-man's land between adjacent territories."
Robert Addie & Sons v. Dumbreck, A.C. 358, 371 (1929), reproduced in PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, at 393 n.I.
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ceptions understandably were created in an attempt to alleviate the harsh
results of the rigid rules.' 4 Despite these judicial exceptions, the law of
premises liability has been slow to keep pace with modern values and mores.
In response, many jurisdictions have recently abandoned or modified the
common law rules. 5 The trend among these jurisdictions has been toward
imposing upon landowners the duty to use reasonable care to maintain their
premises in a safe condition for those who enter the premises and remain
there.16 With the enactment of the Premises Liability Act, Illinois follows
this trend.
A. The Traditional Classification Scheme
It is generally acknowledged that the trespasser-licensee-invitee scheme
had its origins in the English common law and the social and economic
theory of the nineteenth century. 7 Many of the common law standards can
be traced to a feudal culture that was particularly rooted to the land.',
Landowners constituted the mainstay of society and the law carefully guarded
the freedom of landowners to act as they pleased with regard to their
property. 9 The owners were assumed to be the sovereigns of their land.
Consequently, the importance of not interfering with the activities of owners,
except when these activities involved wilful and wanton misconduct, far
outweighed the value of protecting the physical safety of those entering the
owners' premises."' Likewise, the extent of liability for reasonably foreseeable
injury was in its infancy in the mid-nineteenth century. For these reasons,
judges proceeded with caution in imposing new liabilities on landowners. 2'
Moreover, juries largely consisted of the class of potential visitors to the
land, rather than the landowners themselves. As a result, even if judges had
been predisposed to assess the liability of owners based upon the reasonable
14. See infra notes 39-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 80-108 and accompanying text.
16. See id.
17. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69
L.Q. REV. 182, 183-86 (1953); Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573,
576-585 (1942); Turkington, Torts: Toward a General Negligence Standard for the Owner/
Occupier: The Non-User and a Defectively Designed Product; Equitable Apportionment; An
Alternative to Active/Passive Indemnity, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 29, 31 (1972); Comment, The
Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REV. 186, 187-190 (1957);
Annot., 22 A.L.R. 4th 294, 298-99 (1983).
18. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1958).
19. The prevailing idea "was that freedom of contract, enterprise and unrestricted uses of
property were uppermost over human welfare." Comment, supra note 17, at 187. "Subject to
the duty of abstaining from avoidable injury to others, it is every man's right to manage his
own volitions, interests, and property as he will, without liability to one casually harmed
thereby." J. BisHop, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACTUAL LAW 46 (1889).
20. Marsh, supra note 17, at 185; Comment, Liability of Landowners To Children Entering
Without Permission, I I HARV. L. REV. 349, 361-64 (1898), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 357, 369-372 (1924).
21. Marsh, supra note 17, at 185.
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conduct standard, rarely would they have been willing to subject landowners
to the jury's verdict.22
From this setting emerged the three broad categories of trespasser, licensee,
and invitee. Together, they formed the rigid, mechanical system of status
rules used for over a century in England and the United States to determine
owners' duties to entrants upon their land. Assuming an entrant was injured
while on the owner's premises, the determinative issue was the entrant's
status as either a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee. An individual's status
was based upon the entrant's relationship to the landowner and the property.
The entrant's common law status would define the extent of the owner's
duty. For the landowner, the result was varying degrees of immunity from
potential liability based upon the status of the injured entrant.
1. Trespassers
Trespassers 2 were least favored in the law. They entered the premises
without permission, invitation, or other right, intruding for some purpose
or convenience of their own.2 4 Owners had no responsibility to the trespasser,
regardless of the reason for the injury, 25 because the trespasser was a
wrongdoer. Social policy was furthered by eliminating the owner's burden
of watching for and protecting trespassers on the land. 26 The owner had no
duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition for trespassers. 27 Conse-
quently, the injured trespasser could only recover for injuries sustained as a
result of the owner's wilful and wanton misconduct.28
22. Id.
23. The new Illinois Premises Liability Act leaves intact the trespasser category, including
the trespassing child entrant. See supra note 11. Therefore, this Note only briefly discusses the
subject of the trespassing entrant. For a general survey of the status of the trespasser at common
law, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 393-411; Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A
Comparative Survey and Reevaluation, 68 YALE L.J. 633 (1959); James, Tort Liability of
Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
24. See Trout v. Bank of Belleville, 36 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87, 343 N.E.2d 261, 264-5 (5th
Dist. 1976); I J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 19.03 (1982); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra
note 2, at 1435. See, e.g., Hessler v. Cole, 7 Il. App. 3d 902, 289 N.E.2d 204 (1st Dist. 1972)
(plaintiff who went on owner's pier without knowledge of owner's identity and without ever
having met owner was trespasser).
25. Corcoran v. Village of Libertyville, 73 111. 2d 316, 325, 383 N.E.2d 177, 179 (1978);
Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases: I, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 272 (1929), reprinted
in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 185, 202 (1965) (discussing the child
trespasser); J. BISHOP, supra note 19, at 390 ("The owner of land is entitled to keep it in
whatever condition he will, so long as he violates no duty to another. And he owes no duty to
one who comes upon it without right. ... )
26. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 395. It is also suggested that landowners' immunity
is based upon the understanding that a trespasser's presence is unexpected and therefore a
reasonable person would not take steps to protect them. Id. at 394. Still, even where it is
common knowledge that people do trespass, the majority of jurisdictions do not impose an
obligation, regardless of the foreseeability of the trespass. Id.
27. Regardless of whether the trespasser's entry was intentional, negligent, or accidental,
the duty of the owner was the same. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 comment c (1965).
28. Votava v, Material Serv. Corp., 74 Il. App. 3d 208, 212, 392 N.E.2d 768, 771 (2d
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2. Licensees
The licensee, one who entered the premises with the express or implied
permission of the owner, 29 was afforded slightly more protection than the
trespasser. Traditionally, courts imposed upon the owner the same duty for
the licensee as for the trespasser: to refrain from injuring the entrant by
wilful and wanton misconduct."' This duty was expanded, however, as courts
became more willing to find that a failure to disclose or warn against a
known hidden danger might constitute wilful and wanton misconduct.',
Despite the owner's express or implied permission to enter the premises,
licensees still were not among the privileged class of invitees. In theory, the
licensee received the use of the premises as a personal favor, no matter how
cordially invited. Therefore, licensees were expected to accept the owner's
premises as found. 2 The purpose for entering the premises was the decisive
factor distinguishing the licensee from the invitee. Though entering with
permission, licensees were on the owner's premises for their own purposes,
or for some purpose unrelated to the owner's activities." Hence, the social
Dist. 1979); see also authorities cited supra note 24. "Wilful and wanton" misconduct has been
defined as a course of action showing deliberate intention to harm, utter indifference to, or
conscious disregard for, the safety of another. Kapka v. Urbaszewski, 47 Ill. App. 2d 321, 324,
198 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1st Dist. 1964).
29. Schoen v. Harris, 108 Ill. App. 2d 186, 190-92, 246 N.E.2d 849, 852 (3d Dist. 1969);
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at 1471. The common law distinction between licensees
and invitees was based, in part, on the distinction between permission and invitation. As the
official comment to the Restatement says, "invitation is conduct which justifies others in
believing that the possessor desires them to enter the land; permission is conduct justifying
others in believing that the possessor is willing that they shall enter if they desire to do so."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 comment a (1965). The distinction is particularly
transparent, especially when the two concepts are considered in light of their bearing on the
foreseeability of the entrant's presence.
30. Beverly Bank v. Penn Cent. Co., 21 11. App. 3d 73, 81, 315 N.E.2d 110, 113 (lst Dist.
1974).
31. See, e.g., Latimer v. Latimer, 66 II1. App. 3d 685, 688, 384 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ist Dist.
1978) (host's failure to warn social guest of concealed dangerous condition of which owner had
knowledge could be construed as wilful or wanton misconduct); Schoen v. Harris, 108 Ill. App.
2d 186, 191, 246 N.E.2d 849, 852 (3d Dist. 1969) (to constitute wilful and wanton conduct on
part of owner, no ill will is required, because failure to disclose known dangerous condition is
conscious disregard for safety of others); Kapka v. Urbaszewski, 47 111. App. 2d 321, 325, 198
N.E.2d 569, 572 (lst Dist. 1964) (violation of safety ordinance, while possibly constituting
negligence, did not amount to wilful and wanton conduct); I J. DOOLEY, supra note 24, § 19.04
(owner has no duty to warn of obvious and overt dangers, but has duty to refrain from wilful
and wanton negligence).
32. The licensee was said to receive the use of the premises as a "personal favor."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 comment h (1965). Because the owner consented to
the licensee's presence "out of mere grace," the owner was entitled to assume that the licensee;
(1) knew that the owner had no interest in their visit; (2) could not expect any special preparation;
and (3) would be alert to the condition of the premises. F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF
TORTS 183-84 (1926).
33. See, e.g., Kapka v. Urbaszewski, 47 Ill. App. 2d 321, 198 N.E.2d 569, 572 (lst Dist.
1964) (plaintiff entered premises to bring a gift).
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guest, visiting the premises for companionship, diversion, and enjoyment of
hospitality, was within the common law definition of a licensee.1
4
3. Invitees
The common law imposed the highest duty of care upon owners in their
dealings with invitees. Invitees, or business visitors as they were commonly
referred to, entered the premises with the owner's express or implied invi-
tation, for some purpose connected with the business of the owner or an
activity the owner conducted or permitted on the premises.35 A mutually
beneficial interest existed, usually in an economic sense, between the invitor
and invitee.3 6 It was the mutuality of interest that most strongly implied the
existence of the invitor-invitee relationship.37 To this privileged class of
34. See, e.g., Gregor by Gregor v. Kleisor, 111 I1l. App. 3d 333, 336, 443 N.E.2d 1162,
1164-5 (2d Dist. 1982); Ciaglo v. Ciaglo, 20 Ill. App. 2d 360, 367, 156 N.E.2d 376, 379 (lst
Dist. 1959); 1 J. DOOLEY, supra note 24, § 19.05.
In Illinois, the concept of the social guest-as-licensee can be traced to Biggs v. Bear, 320 III.
App. 597, 51 N.E.2d 799 (1st Dist. 1943). In Biggs, the plaintiff was injured in a fall down an
unlighted stairway in the defendant's residence while in search of a bathroom. The plaintiff
had been invited on the premises for a luncheon. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of
the defendant. The appellate court affirmed. In deciding that a social guest is no more than a
licensee, the court looked to the English case of Southcote v. Stanley, I H & N 247, 25 L.J.
Ex. (n.s.) 339, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (1856), the forerunner of most American cases defining the
owner's duty to social guests. It has been noted, however, that the rationale put forward by
the Southcote court "strikes a reader of today as unpersuasive." Pashinian v. Haritonoff, 81
I1l. 2d 377, 383, 410 N.E.2d 21, 23 (1980) (Ward, J., dissenting).
35. See, e.g., Blue v. St. Clair Country Club, 7 Ill. 2d 359, 131 N.E.2d 31 (1955) (member
of country club); Craney v. Union Stockyard & Transit Co., 240 Ill. 602, 88 N.E. 1046 (1909)
(bidder at public auction); Chapman v. Foggy, 59 I11. App. 3d 552, 375 N.E.2d 865 (5th Dist.
1978) (patron at skating rink); Longnecker v. Illinois Power Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 634, 638-39,
381 N.E.2d 709, 713 (5th Dist. 1978) (independent contractor and their employees); Sepesy v.
Archer Daniels Co., 59 Il. App. 3d 56; 58, 375 N.E.2d 180, 182 (4th Dist. 1978) (plaintiff
delivered grain to defendant's processing plant); Coleman v. Chicago Thoroughbred Enter.,
Inc., 102 Ill. App. 2d 400, 243 N.E.2d 333 (1st Dist. 1968) (race track parking lot patron);
Wilkins v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 623, 5 11. App. 2d 370, 125 N.E.2d
549 (3d Dist. 1955) (fraternal lodge member); Fier v. Chicago Orpheum Co., 295 I11. App. 247,
14 N.E.2d 860 (Ist Dist. 1938) (actor in owner's theatre).
36. See, e.g., Burks v. Madyun, 105 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920, 435 N.E.2d 185, 188 (1st Dist.
1982) (babysitter on owner's premises); Mock v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d 103,
105-06, 427 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1st Dist. 1981) (customer went to store to pick up merchandise).
But see Barmore v. Elmore, 83 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1058-59, 403 N.E.2d 1355, 1357 (2d Dist.
1980) (lodge member permitted on owner's premises to pay dues was not invitee of owner since
primary benefit of service ran to fraternal organization and not to property owner himself).
37. See cases cited supra note 36. The Illinois Supreme Court has noted that this test of an
entrant's status as an invitee does not cover all the circumstances that may arise, and therefore
the facts of each case will be controlling. Ellguth v. Blackstone Hotel, Inc., 408 I11. 343, 347-
48, 97 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1951).
Nevertheless, the cases not involving commercial premises or some business activity that have
held that the entrant was entitled to the status of an invitee are relatively few in number. See,
e.g., Burks v. Madyun, 105 Ill. App. 3d 917, 435 N.E.2d 185 (1st Dist. 1982) (plaintiff in
private residence as babysitter); Madrazo v. Michaels, 1 I11. App. 3d 583, 274 N.E.2d 635 (1st
Dist. 1971) (plaintiff assisted her niece in moving into new home and caring for her children);
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entrants, the owner not only owed the obligation to refrain from injuring
the entrant by unreasonably dangerous conduct, but also the affirmative
duty to use reasonable care in making the premises safe. This duty included
discovering dangerous conditions and either correcting them or warning the
invitee of their existence."
B. Common Law Developments
The foregoing scheme of status categories, determining the owner's duty
with reference to the three broad common law distinctions, appeared to
provide a simple, orderly test of the landowner's duty to the injured entrant.
The Illinois courts, however, as well as other jurisdictions, found the need
to mitigate the frequently harsh results of the rigid rules in order to reach
a just result in many instances.3 9 This desire to arrive at an equitable
Drews v. Mason, 29 Ill. App. 2d 269, 172 N.E.2d 383 (3d Dist. 1961) (mother visiting daughter's
home to help with decorating); accord Zuther v. Schild, 224 Kan. 528, 581 P.2d 385 (1978)
(benefit necessary for invitee status is ordinarily a business, economic, pecuniary, or commercial
benefit).
Some courts, however, have used an "invitation" test to determine whether the plaintiff was
an invitee. This test rests on the assumption that the basis of liability is the implied representation
by the owner that the premises are safe, arising from the encouragement or invitation of the
owner. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 422. Dean Prosser argued that the courts have
been more concerned with whether there was an "invitation" than with the question of whether
there was some business interest or expected financial gain. See Prosser, supra note 17, at 611.
He noted, further, that the notion of invitation as the foundation of the owner's duty to an
invitee is essentially sound because "encouragement to enter [carries] an implied assurance of
care taken to make the place safe for the purpose." Id. If this notion is accepted, however, it
applies both to the individual who comes to transact business and to the one who enters on a
social visit at the owner's insistence. For a general discussion of the two tests, see 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra note 2, at 1478-87.
38. Blue v. St. Clair Country Club, 7 Ill. 2d 359, 363, 131 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1955); Chapman
v. Foggy, 59 I1. App. 3d 552, 555, 375 N.E.2d 865, 868 (5th Dist. 1978); 1 J. DOOLEY, supra
note 24, § 19.06; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at 1487.
39. A brief digression demonstrates both the simplicity and the difficulties inherent in the
common law status rules. Under the common law structure, for example, one who takes a
shorter path to a destination by cutting across the owner's gas station, and who is injured
while doing so, is a trespasser and will not be able to recover for injuries in the absence of a
deliberate act by the owner. Briney v. Illinois Cent. R., 401 Ill. 181, 81 N.E.2d 866 (1948). If
this short-cut is typically used by the entrant and others on a daily basis, a habitual acquiescence
in the trespass by the owner may make the entrant a licensee, provided that the tolerance is so
pronounced as to be tantamount to permission. Trout v. Bank of Belleville, 36 Il1. App. 3d
83, 87, 343 N.E.2d 261, 265 (5th Dist. 1976). Yet, the landowner's mere negligence will not
suffice to establish liability; only the wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner, or some
affirmative act by the owner to make the path more dangerous, without notice to the public,
is actionable. Id. The same is true if the entrant has parked his or her car behind the gas
station with the owner's permission and, under cover of darkness, falls into a large hole on
the premises. It makes no difference that the owner customarily permitted those persons who
purchased gas at the station to park behind the station. Mazzeffi v. Schwanke, 52 II1. App. 3d
1032, 368 N.E.2d 441 (1st Dist. 1977), appeal denied, 66 11. 2d 639 (1977); Dent v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 4 Ill. App. 2d 500, 124 N.E.2d 360 (4th Dist. 1955). Assuming, however, that
the entrant had parked the car on the premises in order to have work done, then the entrant
is an invitee to whom the owner owes the duty to act reasonably to make the premises safe.
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resolution unfortunately was coupled with an unwillingness to move from
the formality of the common law categories. Consequently, the Illinois courts
produced a vast array of exceptions to the rules, as well as reclassifications
of various entrants.
At common law, the Illinois courts created special rules to deal with
particular entrants. For example, firemen were considered not to have been
invited onto the premises by the owner, and therefore were not considered
to be invitees. 40 Yet, they were not trespassers, because they were indeed
conferring some benefit upon the owner by their presence. Under the strict
common law definitions, these entrants could only be said to have the owner's
implied permission to enter the premises. Hence, firemen and other public
servants were considered licensees 4-an ironic conclusion given the distinct
benefit bestowed upon the public by their presence.
In 1960, however, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the application of
the licensee label to firemen, elevating them to the status of invitees. In Dini
v. Naiditch,42 one fireman was killed and another severely injured when, in
the course of fighting a fire, a stairway that was not properly attached to a
supporting wall collapsed and fell to the ground. The court held that the
jury properly could have found the landowner liable for failing to exercise
reasonable care in maintaining his property. 43 Firemen, rightfully on the
premises where they might reasonably be expected to be, were invitees entitled
to the exercise of reasonable care by the owner." Recently, the Illinois
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Dini, but refused to extend this
protection to the acts of negligence that caused the fire.45
See, e.g., Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc., 5 Ill. 2d 153, 125 N.E.2d 47 (1955) (plaintiff
injured in fall in parking lot maintained by defendant for patrons' use). Notwithstanding the
entrant's status as an invitee, if the injury was the result of a natural condition on the premises,
such as snow or ice, the owner would have no liability for the injuries sustained. See infra
notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
40. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Il1. 2d 406, 413-17, 170 N.E.2d 881, 884-86 (1960).
41. Id. Professors Harper and James suggest that the owner's limited liability to firemen
and policemen was due, in part, to the belief that the efforts required of the landowner in the
exercise of reasonable care would be overly burdensome due to the infrequency and unpredict-
ability of their visits, and the notion that the public would be deterred from calling upon
firemen and policemen if liability was imposed. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at
1501-03. It has also been suggested that limitations on the liability of owners to firemen, as
well as policemen, have been justified because these employees receive adequate compensation,
including workmen's compensation and disability pension benefits, and on the theory of
assumption of risk. Walker & Dunavant, Liability of A Possessor of Premises To Public
Officials For Physical Harm Caused By A Condition of The Premises-A Rule For Virginia,
17 U. RICH. L. REv. 467, 472 (1983).
42. 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
43. Id. at 417, 170 N.E.2d at 886.
44. Id. at 416-17, 170 N.E.2d at 886.
45. In Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 Ill. 2d 103, 361 N.E.2d 282 (1977), the
shut-off valve in a gasoline hose used at the defendant's station was defective, causing gasoline
to overflow from a car's tank. Id. at 104, 361 N.E.2d at 283. A third party inadvertently
ignited the gasoline and the plaintiff, a fireman, was subsequently injured when he attempted
to avoid an explosion. Id. In response to the plaintiff's allegations, the supreme court found
that "[tlhese acts [of the defendant] relate only to the manner in which the fire was caused.
We have rejected as overly broad a reading of Dini v. Naiditch which would permit liability
to be predicated upon negligence in causing a fire ...." Id. at 109, 361 N.E.2d at 285.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 34:689
The Illinois courts also modified the rule that policemen were licensees.
In Illinois, an owner was obligated to use reasonable care for the protection
of a policeman who was rightfully on the premises.' As in the case of
firemen, however, the owner's liability to policemen did not extend to the
risks inherent in the occupation.4 7 Other public employees, such as sanitary
and safety inspectors, also came to be classified as invitees within the common
law scheme.4
8
The trespasser category also underwent significant modifications at com-
mon law. While the Illinois courts retained the traditional rule regarding the
typical or "bare" trespasser," many subclassifications were created. For
example, when trespassers were known by the owner to frequently use a
particular route, the owner's acquiescence in the continued trespass was said
to amount to permission to use the land."' These frequent trespassers were,
at law, licensees.5 Likewise, the "discovered trespasser rule" caused a
relaxation of the traditional wilful and wanton misconduct standard for
trespassers. This notion provided that an owner owed a duty of reasonable
46, Ryan v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 315 I1. App. 65, 77, 42 N.E.2d 128, 133 (lst Dist. 1942);
see also, Annot., 30 A.L.R. 4th 81 (1984) (survey of owner's duty to police officer).
47. Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 III. 2d 552, 558, 328 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1975); Note,
Landlord's Duty to the Police-Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 378 (1977).
In Fancil, policemen went to the defendant's premises on a routine security check. 60 I11. 2d
at 554, 328 N.E.2d at 539. The building had previously been the subject of attempted and
actual burglaries, and the defendant had installed a mercury light to illuminate a portion of
the building. Id. The light, however, was disconnected, and on the evening of the officers'
search burglars had concealed themselves in the shadows. Id. The officers were ambushed when
they proceeded to the rear of the building. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court held that this was
a risk inherent in a police officer's occupation, and refused to extend the landowner's duty to
guard against the danger. Id. at 558, 328 N.E.2d at 541. Thus, a landowner in Illinois is not
an insurer against the risks that every police officer encounters.
Recently, an off-duty Chicago policeman brought an action against the Chicago Transit
Authority when he was injured while riding on its train. Martin v. Chicago Transit Auth., 128
Ill. App. 3d 837, 471 N.E.2d 544 (1st Dist. 1984). The plaintiff, not in uniform, was injured
when three men boarded the train and shots were exchanged. The action was premised on the
duty of a common carrier to protect its passengers against an unreasonable risk of physical
harm. Id. at 841, 471 N.E.2d at 545. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, relying on the "inherent risk principle" announced in Fancil, supra. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the inherent risk principle was limited to the context of landowner/
occupier liability, and therefore did not bar the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. at 841, 471
N.E.2d at 546.
48. Dini, 20 I11. 2d at 416, 170 N.E.2d at 885; see, e.g., Atchley v. Berlen, 87 I1. App. 3d
61., 408 N.E.2d 1177 (3d Dist. 1980); Leatherman v. Schueler Bros., Inc., 40 11. App. 2d 56,
189 N.E.2d 10 (4th Dist. 1963); Storment v. Swift & Co., 5 111. App. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 697
(4th Dist. 1955); Sutton v. Penn, 238 111. App. 182 (4th Dist. 1925); Kennedy v. Heisen, 182
I1l. App. 200 (Ist Dist. 1913).
49. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
50. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 395-96.
51. Trout v. Bank of Belleville, 36 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87, 343 N.E.2d 261, 265 (5th Dist.
1976). Even in the cases of habitual acquiescence to the trespass, the injured entrant was unable
to recover by demonstrating the owner's mere negligence. Mentesana v. LaFranco, 73 Ill. App.
3d 204, 208, 391 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1st Dist. 1979); Trout, 36 11. App. 3d at 87, 343 N.E.2d
at 265.
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care to a trespasser after the trespasser's presence was discovered in a place
where the trespasser might have been injured by the owner's negligence."
Finally, a third exception was created for trespassing children. This applied
where the owner knew or should have known that children would frequent
a dangerous area, and that they were likely to be injured because of their
inability to appreciate the risk. In Illinois, under these circumstances, there
was a duty to use reasonable care to remedy the condition or otherwise
protect the child from injury." In other words, the trespassing child entrant
in Illinois was treated as a fictitious invitee.
In addition, the Illinois courts created exceptions to deal with particular
circumstances. For instance, the Illinois courts have held the owner to a
greater duty of care based upon the owner's active, as distinguished from
passive, negligence." Such active negligence may arise from the operation
of a car on the premises,5 the use of equipment5 6 or some other affirmative
act by the owner.5 7 Injuries arising from active conduct were distinguished
52. Briney v. Illinois Cent. R., 401 11. 181, 186, 81 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1948); Trout v. Bank
of Belleville, 36 Ill. App. 3d 83, 86, 343 N.E.2d 261, 264 (5th Dist. 1976); Beverly Bank v.
Penn Cent. Co., 21 11. App. 3d 77, 81, 315 N.E.2d 110, 114 (lst Dist. 1974).
53. Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614, 625, 126 N.E.2d 836, 841 (1955). In Kahn,
the Illinois Supreme Court criticized the "attractive nuisance" doctrine as it had existed prior
to that time. Under that doctrine, child trespassers who, because of their immaturity and
inability to appreciate dangerous conditions, were attracted or allured to certain premises were
considered invitees in the law. Id. at 624, 126 N.E.2d at 841. Attraction is only significant, the
Kahn court noted, as it helps to indicate when the trespass should be anticipated. Id. at 625,
126 N.E.2d at 842. The court found that the basis of liability should properly be the foreseeability
of harm to the child. Id.
In Corcoran v. Village of Libertyville, 73 I11. 2d 316, 383 N.E.2d 177 (1978), the Illinois
Supreme Court discussed the foreseeability issue as stated in Kahn, supra. The supreme court
noted two prerequisites to finding that harm to children is foreseeable. First, the owner must
know, or should know, that children frequent the premises. Second, if the cause of the child's
injury was a dangerous condition on the premises, that condition must be one that is likely to
cause injury to the general class of children incapable of appreciating the risk. Id. at 326, 383
N.E.2d at 180. "If both of these prerequisites are met, it is deemed that harm to children is
sufficiently foreseeable for the law to impel an owner or occupier of land to remedy the
condition." Id.
54. For a general discussion of the active/passive distinction, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 2, at 1475-76.
55. In Cullmann v. Mumper, 83 I11. App. 2d 395, 228 N.E.2d 276 (3d Dist. 1967), for
example, the defendant asked the plaintiff to meet him at his house. The plaintiff arrived first
and remained in her car in the driveway. When the defendant arrived he proceeded to back
his car into the driveway at a speed of 25 to 35 miles per hour, knowing plaintiff was in her
car, and subsequently struck the plaintiff's car, injuring her. The appellate court affirmed the
jury's verdict for the plaintiff, rejecting the defendant's contention that as a social guest the
plaintiff was only owed the duty to refrain from wilfully and wantonly injuring her. Id. at 397,
228 N.E.2d at 277. Recognizing the distinction between injuries resulting from the condition
of the premises and those resulting from the owner's activities, the appellate court stated that
in the latter context, where the plaintiff is known to be on the premises, the owner has the
duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury caused by affirmative activity. Id. at 401, 228
N.E.2d at 279.
56. See Kay v. Ludwick, 87 Il. App. 2d 114, 230 N.E.2d 494 (4th Dist. 1967) (four-year
old child injured by riding lawn mower).
57. See Moore v. Ohio Oil Co., 241 Ill. App. 388 (4th Dist. 1926) (defendant stretched wire
cable across roadway).
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from injuries resulting from the owner's failure to maintain the premises.18
Accordingly, if a licensee's presence was known or should have been known,
the owner might be held liable for failing to exercise ordinary care for the
visitor's safety.59
Unfortunately, not all of the special rules developed by the Illinois courts
were favorable to the injured entrant. An exception that particularly favored
the landowner was the "natural conditions rule." The natural conditions
rule absolved the landowner of liability for injuries to an entrant that resulted
from natural conditions on the land, such as a natural accumulation of snow
and ice.' This was so even if the condition was present for such a time that
the courts would normally charge the owner with knowledge of the potential
danger .6 Liability was imposed only in situations where an act of the owner
caused an unnatural condition or where the owner had aggravated the
condition originally created by natural elements. 2
Finally, a great deal of attention in recent years has been attracted by
those cases that deal with the liability of an owner for the criminal acts of
third parties. In Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc.,6 3 for example,
the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the owner of a currency
exchange for damages resulting from the death of her husband during an
armed robbery attempt. The robber entered the store, placed a gun to Boyd's
head, and told the teller to give him the money or Boyd would be killed.'
The teller did not accede, but fell to the floor, and Boyd was shot in the
head. 65 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendants did not owe the
58. See, e.g., Chapman v. Foggy, 59 I1. App. 3d 552, 375 N.E.2d 865 (5th Dist. 1978)
(plaintiff received injuries from splinter in wood railing in defendant's skating rink); Lewis v.
Hull House Assoc., 25 111. App. 3d 617, 323 N.E.2d 600 (1st Dist. 1975) (plaintiff injured in
fall from stationary ladder allegedly constructed too close to wall).
59. See, e.g., Cullmann v. Mumper, 83 I1. App. 2d 395, 401, 228 N.E.2d 276, 279 (3d
Dist. 1967).
60. See, e.g., Foster v. Cyrus & Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 274, 277-79, 276 N.E.2d 38, 41 (1st
Dist. 1971); Zide v. Jewel Tea Co., 93 I1. App. 2d 217, 222-23, 188 N.E.2d 383, 385-86 (1963).
61. Wolter v. Chicago Melrose Park Assoc., 68 I1. App. 3d 1011, 1018, 386 N.E.2d 495,
499-500 (1st Dist. 1979); Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 16 11. App. 3d 1065, 1068, 307
N.E.2d 449, 452 (2d Dist. 1974); see cases cited supra note 60.
62. Clauson v. Lake Forest Improvement Trust, I Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1045, 275 N.E.2d 441,
444 (2d Dist. 1971); see, e.g., Graham v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638, 178 N.E. 911 (1931)
(city allowed water from adjacent skating pond to overflow onto sidewalk where plaintiff was
injured in fall on resulting ice); Lapidus v. Hahn, 115 Il. App. 3d 795, 450 N.E.2d 824 (1st
Dist. 1983) (defective condition of roof and depression in front of tenant's door caused unnatural
accumulation of ice on which plaintiff was injured); Linde v. Welch, 95 Ill. App. 3d 581, 420
N.E.2d 490 (Ist Dist. 1981) (plaintiff injured when leaky overhead gutter caused ice to form
on stairs below); McCann v. Bethesda Hosp., 80 I1. App. 3d 544, 400 N.E.2d 16 (Ist Dist.
1979) (whether slope of parking lot caused unnatural accumulation of ice was question for
jury); Cupp v. Nelson, 5 Ill. App. 3d 37, 282 N.E.2d 513 (Ist Dist. 1972) (jury could find that
owner's attempt to remove natural accumulation of snow with application of rock salt aggravated
condition, thereby imposing duty of care); Fitzsimons v. National Tea Co., 29 I11. App. 2d
306, 173 N.E.2d 534 (2d Dist. 1961) (improper placement of drain spout allowed ice to
accumulate and freeze over customer's path).
63. 56 !11. 2d 95, 306 N.E.2d 39 (1973).
64. Id. at 96, 306 N.E.2d at 40.
65. Id.
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invitee Boyd a duty to comply with the demand of the criminal. 66 The court
determined that nothing would have prevented Boyd's death except a com-
plete acquiescence to the robber's demands, and even that was speculative
at best. 67 The court reasoned that to create a duty to accede to criminal
demands would impose upon the owner an unwarranted dilemma: whether
to comply and surrender the money or to refuse and be held civilly liable
for damages to the customer. 68
The Boyd court decided that the owner did not have a duty to accede to
the criminal demands of a third party. The plaintiff in Boyd, however, did
not raise the issue of whether the owner had a duty to guard against the
criminal attacks of third parties. In this regard, the Illinois courts appear to
be more willing to place the responsibility upon the owner of the premises.
Where there are previous incidents or special circumstances that enable the
court to charge the owner with knowledge of the danger, the owner's
responsibility may include the duty to guard entrants against the criminal
attacks of third persons. 61
66. Id. at 100, 306 N.E.2d at 42.
67. Id. at 99-100, 306 N.E.2d at 42.
68. Id. at 100, 306 N.E.2d at 42. In his dissent, Justice Goldenhersh urged that the case be
given to the trier of fact, stating that the majority's considerations find "little support in logic
and none whatsoever in the legal authorities." Id. at 101, 306 N.E.2d at 42 (Goldenhersh, J.,
dissenting).
69. Burks v. Madyun, 105 Ill. App. 3d 917, 921, 435 N.E.2d 185, 189 (1st Dist. 1982);
Krautstrunk v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 95 Ill. App. 3d 529, 534, 420 N.E.2d 429, 433 (1st Dist.
1981); O'Brien v. Colonial Village, Inc., 119 I11. App. 2d 105, 108, 255 N.E.2d 205, 207 (2d
Dist. 1970); see also Phillips v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 89 111. 2d 123, 431 N.E.2d 1038 (1982)
(complaint alleging that owner voluntarily undertook to close off and secure certain floors of
building in order to prevent commission of crimes and did so negligently states a cause of
action); Cross v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 74 Ill. App. 3d 921, 393 N.E.2d 580 (lst Dist. 1979),
aff'd, Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 82 Ill. 2d 313, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980) (where defendant
had no duty at law, but voluntarily assumed duty to provide security guards for benefit of
persons on premises, defendant may be negligent in failing to provide security services during
late evening hours if failure created known dangerous condition); Pippin v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979) (where defendant voluntarily provided guard
services on premises, without independent duty to protect against criminal acts on premises,
defendant's liability for negligent hiring of guard service was question for jury); Stribling v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1st Dist. 1975) (where plaintiff's
apartment had been burglarized on three separate occasions, by breaking through wall from
adjacent, vacant apartment, defendant owed plaintiff duty to guard against subsequent burglaries
after reasonable notice). But see Martin v. Usher, 55 Ill. App. 3d 409, 371 N.E.2d 69 (1st Dist.
1977) (landlord has no duty to control conduct of third persons so as to prevent third person
from causing physical injury to tenant); Smith v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 36 I11. App. 3d 967,
344 N.E.2d 536 (1st Dist. 1976) (landlord defendant has no duty to protect tenants against
criminal acts of third persons which occur on premises); Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill.
App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1st Dist. 1973) (notwithstanding knowledge of risk of injury,
owner of multiple dwelling unit has no actionable duty to protect tenant from fatal injuries
caused by criminally reckless acts of third person); Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural History,
5 111. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1st Dist. 1972) (absent knowledge of previous incidents or
special circumstances to charge owners with knowledge of danger, defendant not obligated to
guard against risk that 12-year-old would be assaulted by other youths while on school trip).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 34:689
When one considers the exceptions noted above, as well as others,"' it
becomes apparent that the Illinois courts have found the need to adapt the
trespasser-licensee-invitee rules to changing social values and policies. Change
by exception, however, is a slow process, frequently leading the courts away
from the relevant considerations. The Illinois Premises Liability Act abolishes
the common law licensee and invitee categories, imposing upon the owner
the duty of reasonable care under all the circumstances for these entrants. 7'
In so doing, the Act eliminates the need for change by exception. It provides
instead a flexible framework for determining a landowner's liability to such
entrants. Illinois, however, is not the first jurisdiction to recognize the need
to move away from the common law rules.
C. The Movement A way From The Traditional Distinctions
The movement toward discarding or modifying the trespasser-licensee-
invitee distinctions began in England. In 1957, the English Parliament adopted
the Occupier's Liability Act,7 2 which merges the categories of licensees and
invitees. Alternatively, the Act imposes upon the owner of property a
"common duty of care" toward all persons lawfully upon the premises. 713
70. Many states, for example, have enacted "recreational use of land and water area
statutes" that limit the liability of an owner who makes land or water available to the public
for recreational purposes. The Illinois Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act provides
that an owner owes no duty to keep the premises safe for the entry or use of any person for
recreational purposes, or to give warning of any dangerous condition on premises used for
such purposes. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 33 (Supp. 1984). But when the owner's failure to
guard or warn against the dangerous condition was wilful or malicious, or when the injury was
suffered by one paying an admission fee, the owner may be subject to liability. Id. § 36 (Supp.
1984). Apparently, some 42 other states have enacted such statutes. Comment, Landowner
Liability Under The Wyoming Recreational Use Statute, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 649, 650
n.4 (1980).
Additionally, under the Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act, an owner of premises owes
no duty to keep the premises safe for the use/entry of others for the purpose of snowmobiling,
or to give warning of unsafe conditions on the premises. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 605-
I(I) (Supp. 1984). This does not apply where the snowmobiler has given consideration in
exchange for the owner's permission. Id. Permission alone, however, does not assure that the
premises are safe, and does not indicate the owner's assumption of responsibility. Id. § 605-
I(J). Notwithstanding, the owner may be liable for "willful or malicious failure to guard or
warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity." Id. §§ 605-1(1)-(J).
71. See supra note 1I.
72. Occupier's Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, ch. 31 (1957). The Act states that "An occupier
of premises owes the same duty, the 'common duty of care', to all his visitors, except in so
far as he is free to and does extend, restrict, modify or exclude his duty to any visitor or
visitors by agreement or otherwise." Id. § 2(1). The preamble, however, limits the scope of the
Act's protection to "injury or damage resulting to persons or goods lawfully on any land or
other property .... Preamble to Occupier's Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, ch. 31 (1957)
(emphasis added).
73. The "common duty of care" is essentially a standard of reasonable conduct. The
Occupier's Liability Act defines the standard as "a duty to take such care as in all the
circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using
the premises for the purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there."
Id. § 2(2).
More recently, the English law has been modified to include a duty to treat all trespassers
with "common humanity." Keeler, Recent Developments in the Law of Occupiers and Tres-
passers, 46 AUSTL. L.J. 444 (1972).
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The trend toward abolishing the common law distinctions has been much
slower in the United States. In 1958, in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique,74 the United States Supreme Court was asked to apply the
common law rules of premises liability to the law of admiralty. The Supreme
Court declined to do so. In Kermarec, the plaintiff went aboard the defend-
ant's ship to pay a social call upon one of the ship's crew.75 The plaintiff
was injured when he fell on a stairway. He brought an action for his injuries
based on negligence. 76 The lower court held that under New York law the
common law status categories applied to deny the plaintiff recovery.77 The
Supreme Court, however, noted the outmoded heritage of the common law
classifications and the "semantic morass" through which the common law
had moved toward imposing a single duty of reasonable care in all circum-
stances."8 Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court, refused to burden
the admiralty law with the subtle, and often confusing, distinctions of the
traditional common law rules. 9
Ten years later, California became the first state to discard the common
law categories of trespasser, licensee, and invitee. In Rowland v. Christian,8 °
the plaintiff was injured while using a bathroom faucet during a visit to the
defendant's apartment.8" The plaintiff sued based on negligence. The defend-
ant responded that the plaintiff was merely a social guest.8 2 On this basis,
the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 3 On
appeal, the California Supreme Court found that, regardless of the historical
justifications for the common law rules, they were no longer applicable in
modern society.14 The classifications, the court noted, often do not reflect
the factors that should determine the landowner's liability. These factors
include the connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of pre-
venting future harm. 5 Therefore, the California Supreme Court abolished
74. 358 U.S. 625 (1958).
75. Id. at 626.
76. Id. at 626-27.
77. Id. at 627.
78. Id. at 630-31. Because the Court found that admiralty law and not the substantive law
of New York applied, it was necessary to determine whether the lower court's misapplication
of the law resulted in prejudice to the plaintiff. Id. at 629-30. While under admiralty law a
shipowner owed a duty of reasonable care to those lawfully aboard the vessel, the duty to a
visitor who could be a "licensee" remained undecided. Id. at 630.
79. Id. at 630-31. Justice Stewart noted that the imposition of the status rules on the
admiralty law would be "contrary to its traditions of simplicity and practicality." Id. at 631.
Hence, the Court held that "the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on
board for purpose not inimical to his legitimate interests the duty of exercising reasonable care
under the circumstances of each case." Id. at 632.
80. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
81. Id. at 110, 443 P.2d at 562, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
85. Id.
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the traditional scheme in favor of imposing a uniform duty upon the
landowner to act reasonably under all the circumstances.16
Since Rowland, nearly one-half of the states have joined the movement
to abolish or modify the common law categories. The use of the common
law scheme has been abandoned in toto in Hawaii" 7 Colorado," Rhode
Island,8 9 New York, 9" New Hampshire, 9 Louisiana, 9 Alaska,93 and the Dis-
trict of Columbia." These jurisdictions have replaced the common law scheme
with the standard of reasonable care under all the circumstances. 91
With the passage of the Premises Liability Act, Illinois joins Minne-
sota,96 Massachusetts,97 Wisconsin,"l North Dakota, 9 Tennessee,", and
Maine"" in partially modifying the common law scheme by eliminating
the licensee-invitee distinction. These states created a broad category of
"rightful" entrants to whom the owner owes the duty of reasonable care.
These rightful entrants include all persons except trespassers. "'2 Finally,
86. The court concluded that the proper test of an owner's liability should be whether the
owner has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others. Id. at 119,
443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. Moreover, while the plaintiff's common law status may,
in light of the facts giving rise to such status, have some bearing on the question of liability,
it is no longer determinative. Id.
87. See Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969);
Gibo v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 299, 459 P.2d 198 (1969).
88. See Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 2d 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
89. See Mariorienzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975).
90. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 (1976); Scurti
v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 354 N.E.2d 794 (1976).
91. See Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976).
92. See Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833
(1976).
93. See Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977).
94. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973).
95. "Reasonable care" is determined with reference to all the facts surrounding the owner's
conduct. For instance, in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1968), the California Supreme Court considered the facts that the defendant knew of the
defective condition of the premises, the defect posed a danger, the plaintiff was about to come
in contact with the defect, and the defect was not obvious to others. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at
568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. Under these circumstances, the court found that " the trier of fact
can reasonably conclude that a failure to warn or to repair the condition constitutes negligence."
Id.
96. See Peterson v. Balanch, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
97. See. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
98. See Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d I (1975).
99. See O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977).
100. See Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1984).
101. See Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979).
102. "Rightful" entrants, as used herein, refers to all persons entering the owner's premises
who are not properly trespassers by reason of the owner's invitation or permission, express or
implied. It does not, however, encompass those members of the trespasser category who are
afforded a higher degree of protection under the common law exceptions. See supra notes 49-
53 and accompanying text.
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Missouri,'3 Washington,"' Kentucky," 5 Florida, 1 6 Michigan,"'7 and Conn-
ecticut 0 8 have limited their modification to the elevation of the social
guest into the invitee category or, alternatively, have established special
standards of care for social guests.
THE ILLINOIS PREMISES LIABILITY ACT
The Illinois Premises Liability Act abolishes the licensee-invitee dichot-
omy. 10 9 Instead, the Act imposes upon the owner of property the duty to
such entrants of "reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the
state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them."''" The status of the
trespasser, including the trespassing child, remains as it did under prior
Illinois law."' Likewise, the responsibility of an owner to persons entering
or using the premises for a recreational purpose is unaffected.' 2
At common law, the duty owed by a landowner to an invitee was active
and positive." 3 It included the duty to protect or warn against an unreason-
able risk of harm that was foreseeable. This was true not only with regard
to known dangers, but also with respect to dangers that were discoverable
in the exercise of reasonable care. The change in Illinois law does not alter
the owner's duty to the common law invitee. Instead, Illinois landowners
now owe the same positive duty to both the common law licensee and
invitee. "'
103. See Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1976) (eliminating all distinctions once an
entrant's presence is known).
104. See Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wash. 2d 685, 538 P.2d 517 (1975) (eliminating distinction
between licensee and invitee once presence is known).
105. See Hardin v. Harris, 507 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1974) (eliminating distinction between invitee
and licensee once presence is known).
106. See Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973) (owner has obligation to use reasonable
care for licensees expressly or impliedly invited).
107. See Preston v. Sleziak, 16 Mich. App. 18, 167 N.W.2d 477 (1969) (social guests expressly
or impliedly invited upon premises are owed duty of reasonable care by owners).
108. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557(a) (West Supp. 1984) (standard of care owed to
"social invitee" same as to "business invitee").
109. Premises Liability Act, Pub. Act No. 83-1398 at § 2.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at § 3.
112. Id. at § 4. See supra note 70 for discussion of owner's responsibility to those entering
the premises for a recreational purpose.
113. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
114. The presumption that the Act was intended to raise the duty owed to licensees to the
level of invitees is based upon two notions. First, neither the Illinois Supreme Court nor other
jurisdictions that have urged the abolition of the status categories have suggested that the duty
of care toward invitees is to be less than it previously was at common law. Second, the language
of the Act contemplates an active, positive duty. By including the duty to use reasonable care
with regard to omissions as well as active conduct, the Act proposes liability for a failure to
inspect or to repair. Conversely, it may be said that the Act contemplates an affirmative duty
for the benefit of all lawful entrants to use reasonable care not only with regard to known
dangers, but also with respect to hazards that may be discovered in the exercise of reasonable
care.
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The Premises Liability Act draws the line of demarcation between those
entrants who are rightfully on the premises, and those who, like the tres-
passer, are wrongfully on the premises. Instead of three categories, as in the
common law scheme, the Act creates two broad categories: rightful entrants
and trespassers. Those persons entering the premises with the owner's express
or implied consent' 5 are considered "rightful" entrants. The owner owes all
rightful entrants the duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises
in a safe condition and to refrain from injuring these visitors by affirmative
conduct. The owner's duty to trespassers, however, will still be determined
under the common law rules. Hence, the exceptions created for frequent
trespassers, child trespassers, and discovered trespassers will still be applied." 6
Under the prior Illinois law, the common law distinctions were crucial to
the plaintiff's case. The owner's duty to the plaintiff depended upon the
plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. The Illinois Premises
Liability Act abandons this approach, at least with respect to licensees and
invitees. Under the Act, the owner has the duty to use reasonable care under
the circumstances, regardless of the entrant's status. This, however, is not
to say that the landowner is an insurer of the safety of all rightful entrants.'
The owner's liability to an injured visitor is to be determined with reference
to all the circumstances surrounding the incident. Consideration will be given
to, among other things, the foreseeability of the entrants' presence, the
likelihood of injury to them, the seriousness of the injury, the burden of
avoiding the risk, and the social policies that are furthered by imposing
liability upon the owner. ' X
115. The term "consent" is used here in an effort to select a word that adequately encom-
passes all rightful entrants, that is, all those who do not fall within the common law trespasser
category. The author acknowledges, however, that any effort to define the particular charac-
teristics of the "rightful" entrant will necessarily be misleading.
116. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
117. Applying the reasonable conduct standard to the favored class of business invitees,
Illinois courts have repeatedly noted that possessors of land are not insurers for all accidents
or injuries occurring on their premises. See, e.g., Timmons v. Turski, 103 Ill. App. 3d 36, 430
N.E.2d 1135 (5th Dist. 1981) (patient fell on ice in front of dentist's office); Longnecker v.
Illinois Power Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 634, 381 N.E.2d 709 (5th Dist. 1978) (subcontractor's
employee fell from power company's distribution pole); Donoho v. O'Connell's Inc., 13 111.
App. 2d 250, 141 N.E.2d 661 (Ist Dist. 1957), rev'd, 13 Ill. 2d 113, 148 N.E.2d 434 (1958)
(patron of restaurant slipped on food).
Likewise, it is interesting to note that Illinois courts have at least twice emphatically rejected
claims that an owner should be subjected to strict liability in tort. Hutter v. Badalamenti, 47
Ill. App. 3d 561, 362 N.E.2d 114 (5th Dist. 1977); Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49
Ill. App. 3d 480, 364 N.E.2d 502 (Ist Dist. 1977). One writer, however, envisions strict liability
for defective business premises as the logical extension of the trend in the area of premises
liability and the recent development of the theory of strict products liability. Ursin, Strict
Liability For Defective Business Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland And Greenman, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 820, 844-45 (1975).
118. McGinty v. Nissen, 127 Ill. App. 3d 618, 621, 469 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ist Dist. 1984);
Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 247, 261-62, 433 N.E.2d
1350, 1361 (2d Dist. 1982).
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A strict textual reading of the Act suggests that the status of the entrant
as a licensee or invitee will no longer be considered.'' 9 Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to assume that the circumstances of a visitor's entry upon the
owner's premises will continue to have an effect upon the question of the
owner's potential liability. In determining whether an entrant was an invitee
or licensee, the courts previously considered whether the entrant had been
permitted or invited on the premises, the purpose for the visit, and other
factual questions. Under a reasonableness standard, these considerations
become useful in determining the foreseeability of the entrant's presence.
Foreseeability of a visitor's entry determines, in part, the likelihood of injury
to the visitor. 20 It also helps to calculate the extent of the interest that may
be sacrificed in order to avoid the risk of injury. 2' Thus, while the entrant's
common law status may not be expressly referred to, it will implicitly be
considered by the court. Importantly, however, the circumstances of the
visitor's entry, or the visitor's common law status as a licensee or invitee, is
relegated to a subordinate role. It is only one of the myriad factors to
consider when determining the issue of liability.
ANALYSIS
The Illinois legislature left little clue as to the concerns prompting its
revision of the common law approach. 2  Nevertheless, the change in Illinois
law accomplished by the Premises Liability Act is strongly supported by the
twenty-one jurisdictions that have moved away from the common law rules. 23
As a result, there is a substantial body of academic and judicial discussion
in this area that provides insight into the motivation for this trend in the
law of premises liability.
In analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the Premises Liability Act,
it is helpful to examine the role of the Illinois Supreme Court. Indeed, it is
clear that the court prompted the change in the law of premises liability.'24
119. The Illinois Premises Liability Act expressly abolishes the distinction between licensees
and invitees. See supra note II. Thus, on its face the Act alleviates the need to classify an
entrant as either an invitee or licensee. Arguably, because the Act creates two classes of entrants,
rightful and wrongful, this is the only determination that must be made.
120. Some courts, such as the California Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.
2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), have made specific reference to the use of the
status rules after their abolition. See supra note 86. There is some question, however, as to the
benefit of this approach. Apparently, the Rowland court's suggestion that the categories still
have some vitality led to hesitation by the lower courts of that state to immediately adopt the
new approach. See Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal. Rptr.
914 (1969) (reading Rowland as abrogating only licensee category, and holding that the sub-
stantive duties of owners to invitees, as outlined by prior case law, are consonant with Rowland).
121. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. 1977).
122. The State of Illinois rarely publishes transcripts of the House or Senate debates or of
the various committee meetings. it may be noted, however, that earlier attempts were made to
change the Illinois law of premises liability. See S. 1283, 81st Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1981 Sess.
(1981) (died in committee).
123. See supra notes 80-108 and accompanying text.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 131-47.
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Furthermore, contemporary social policy, concerned with the safety of the
individual in society, supports the new approach." 5 Two concerns, however,
are evident. One is the potential for eliminating all predictability and stability
in the law of premises liability. Yet, there is little reason to believe that the
common law status rules provided any greater predictability than may be
expected under the Act. 2 6 Second, there is concern for the greater role of
the jury created by the Premises Liability Act.'27 Nevertheless, general neg-
ligence theory provides ample control over the limits of liability. Additionally,
the available evidence suggests that there is no need to fear a substantial
increase in owners' liability. 2 1
The Premises Liability Act eliminates the confusion and injustice incident
to classifying entrants as licensees and invitees. 29 Unfortunately, the Act
stops short of completely abandoning the common law status rules. Main-
taining the trespasser status perpetuates, in part, the confusion and com-
plexity that existed at common law. Moreover, there is no reason to believe
that the reasonable conduct standard will be unable to adequately fix the
limits of landowners' liability to trespassers. Finally, social policy urges the
abolition of the trespasser status. 30
A. The Role of the Illinois Supreme Court
From all appearances, the Illinois Supreme Court was content with the
common law trespasser-licensee-invitee trichotomy. The Illinois Supreme
Court most recently addressed the issue in 1980, when a majority of the
court refused to modify the traditional classification scheme. In Pashinian
v. Haritonoff,3 ' the plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries sustained
when she fell down a flight of stairs in the defendant's home while in search
of a bathroom.'12 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint. "3 The apparent basis of this ruling was that the plaintiff was a
social guest and therefore, as a licensee, was unable to recover without
demonstrating wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of the owner.'34
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, given its ancient origins, the tradi-
tional classification scheme was no longer applicable.'35 Further, the plaintiff
noted that the exceptions to the general classification rules caused confusion
and created doubt as to the validity of the doctrine. The plaintiff urged the
adoption of a single standard of ordinary care to be applied in all premises
125. See infra text accompanying notes 148-63.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 164-75.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 176-201.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 183-201.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 202-21.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 222-35.
131. 81 111. 2d 377, 410 N.E.2d 21 (1980).
132. Id. at 379, 410 N.E.2d at 21.
133. Id. The appellate court's opinion was an unpublished order under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 23. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 380, 410 N.E.2d at 21.
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liability cases.' 36 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, was unpersuaded.
The court took the position that owners are entitled to some degree of
protection from liability on their own property. 3 ' The court found that the
common law status scheme provided an appropriate balance between the
need for such immunity and the imposition of liability for tortious conduct. 3 '
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff's complaint had been properly
dismissed. Finally, the court stressed that any change in the common law
was best accomplished on a case-by-case basis.' 39
Notwithstanding the decision in Pashinian, it is clear that the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized the need to move away from the common law
approach. The court strongly advocated such a change in its 1978 Annual
Report to the Illinois General Assembly.'40 Submitted almost six months
before the Pashinian opinion, the report charged that the Illinois courts were
"struggling to do justice" within the arbitrary labels of the common law
classifications. 4 ' In the report the court also acknowledged, with approval,
the trend away from the traditional distinctions both in England 42 and in
the American courts.' 43 Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court urged the
legislature to adopt a uniform standard of reasonable care, based on fore-
seeability of harm, to replace the trespasser, licensee, and invitee classifica-
tions. 44
The Illinois Supreme Court renewed its opposition to the common law
status rules one year after the decision in Pashinian. In the Illinois Supreme
Court's 1980 Annual Report to the General Assembly, 45 the court again
invited the Illinois legislature to assess the merits of a common standard of
reasonable care. 46 Understandably, the court addressed the inconsistency
between its earlier recommendations and the court's position in Pashinian.
The report stated that the legislature's prerogative to address the viability
of the common law rules was implicit in the Pashinian opinion.147 Thus, it
136. Id. at 380, 410 N.E.2d at 21-22.
137. Id. at 380-81, 410 N.E.2d at 22.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that a change in the circumstances on
which the law of premises liability is based would justify a change in the law. Id. The court,
however, added that the "conditions have not so changed that the common law should be
rewritten." Id.
140. 1978 Annual Report of the Supreme Court to the General Assembly (submitted Jan.
31, 1979), reprinted in 1978 ANNUAL REPORT To THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS 19 [hereinafter
cited as 1978 ANNUAL REPORT].
141. Id.
142. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
144. 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 140, at 19.
145. 1980 Annual Report of the Supreme Court to the General Assembly, (submitted Jan.
31, 1981), reprinted in 1980 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS 21 [hereinafter
cited as 1980 ANNUAL REPORT].
146. Id. at 21-22.
147. Id. at 21. The hesitation to depart from the common law rules regarding premises
liability, leaving the issue to the legislature, demonstrated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Pashinian, is frequently seen in premises liability cases. See, e.g., Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski,
19851
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 34:689
is apparent that the Illinois Supreme Court recognized and openly advocated
the abolition of the common law rules for nearly six years before the passage
of the Premises Liability Act.
B. Policy Considerations
The proponents of the trespasser-licensee-invitee rules point to the policies
underlying the common law approach and assert the continued viability of
those policies. 4 For example, in regard to trespassers, social policy favors
the uninhibited use of one's land, free from the burden of watching for and
protecting wrongful entrants. 49 Similarly, the licensee or social guest receives
the use of the premises as a gift, somewhat akin to a member of the family.
Therefore, the licensee should accept the premises in their present condition,
with no expectation that the owner will do more than refrain from wilful
and wanton misconduct.5 0 The mere presence of the invitee, however, pre-
sumably benefits the owner in a material sense; thus, the invitee is entitled
to expect that the premises will be maintained in a safe condition. 5' Clearly,
these rationalizations emerge from the underlying policy favoring the free
use and enjoyment of one's property over the safety and mobility of the
public. 11
Those who favor the abandonment of the common law classifications
assert, on the other hand, that the policies that led to the creation of the
trespasser-licensee-invitee categories no longer retain their viability in a mod-
ern society.' Society's steadily increasing concern for the general safety of
70 Wis. 2d 836, 859-870, 236 N.W.2d I, 15 (1975) (Hansen, J., dissenting); Mariorenzi v.
Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 307-10, 333 A.2d 127, 135 (1975) (Joslin, J., dissenting);
Woodward v. Newstein, 37 Md. App. 285, 302, 377 A.2d 535, 544-5 (1977).
With few exceptions, however, the traditional scheme of status categories has been a wholly
judge-made doctrine. As the late Justice Dooley of the Illinois Supreme Court argued: "it is
the fundamental duty of courts to keep the common law current with the problems and mores
of the day .... Since it was the judiciary which was the genesis of these particular labels, it
is the judiciary which must abolish them." Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 Ill. 2d
103, 117-18, 361 N.E.2d 282, 289 (1977) (Dooley, J., dissenting).
148. See, e.g., McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d 950, 951 (Ala. 1977) (asserting the rationale
behind the social guest-as-licensee rule); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 864-65,
236 N.W.2d I, 15 (1975) (Hansen, J., dissenting) (resting upon economic policy behind licensee-
invitee distinction).
149. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 32.
151. Dean Prosser declared:
The theory adopted is that .. .the duty of affirmative care to make the premises
safe is the price which the man in possession must pay for the economic benefit,
present or prospective, to be derived from the visitor's presence, and that when no
such benefit is to be found, he is under no such duty.
Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573, 574 (1942).
152. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at 1432. See also supra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 103 (1968); Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 III. 2d 103, 117, 361 N.E.2d 282, 289
(1977) (Dooley, J., dissenting) ("When it is considered that most of today's population live in
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the individual, many cases and commentators suggest, outweighs the privi-
leges of land ownership. 54 In fact, the growing feeling that human safety is
of greater importance than the landowners' interest in unrestricted use of
their land can be seen in the exceptions created to the general common law
rule regarding trespassers.' The recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court, elevating firemen and policemen to the status of invitee from their
former position within the common law licensee category, also illustrate this
attitude. 6
industrialized, urban communities, and that the social and economic relationships of the man
of the day are both complex and close, the logic of abandoning the labels ... is compelling");
Walton v. Norphlett, 56 I1. App. 3d 4, 6, 371 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ist Dist. 1977) (Linn, J.,
specially concurring) (common law distinctions "have become unworkable in a modern indus-
trialized society where individual and economic relationships are no longer based on feudalistic
notions"); Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 253, 384 A.2d 76, 85 (1978) (Levine,
J., dissenting) (continued adherence to the common law rules "conflicts with the goal of
distributing risks of personal injury over large segments of the population and prevents efficient
allocation of social resources"); Turkington, supra note 17, at 31 ("A thoroughly industrialized
and urban society consists of more complex economic and individual relationships than those
found in a feudal society").
One legal writer has criticized the reasoning behind the "social policy argument" that many
courts have used to justify the trend away from the common law rules. Comment, The Common
Law Tort Liability of Owners and Occupiers Of Land: A Trap For The Unwary?, 36 Mo. L.
REV. 816 (1977). The writer suggests that the contrast between urban, industrialized conditions
and those existing when the conmmor law status rules took shape is misleading. Id. at 836. The
writer believes that this contrast fails to recognize the similarity between current rural and
suburban environments. Id. at 836-37. These environments, it is suggested, closely resemble the
general physical characteristics of manorial property holdings. Id. It is submitted, however,
that the manorial system of property holding in nineteenth century England was distinctly
different from contemporary suburban conditions. M. KEEN, THE PELICAN HISTORY OF ME-
DIEVAL EUROPE 47-60 (1969). Moreover, while the social policy argument is infrequently artic-
ulated with specificity, the underlying notion is clear: the vast majority of the population is
concentrated in urban centers of the United States. This circumstance gives rise to the changes
in individual and economic relationships that have, in turn, affected social policy.
154. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 706-7, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (1973) ("We can no
longer follow this ancient and largely discredited common law distinction which favors the free
use of property without due regard to the personal safety of those individuals .... ); Smith
v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. 1977) ("human safety is of greater
importance than a land occupier's unrestricted freedom"). See also Comment, Torts-Abro-
gation of Common-Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee, and Invitee, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 623, 627 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Abrogation of Common-Law Entrant
Classes] (noting the general feeling "that the importance of human safety often transcends that
of the landowner's freedom"); Comment, Land Occupant's Liability To Invitees, Licensees,
And Trespasers, 31 TENN. L. REV. 485, 486 (1964) (pointing to the "keener regard for hurftan
welfare" leading courts to look more favorably on the injured party).
155. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 395; supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. As one judge noted, "the American
courts have sought to modify the rule and substitute a more logical and humane rule ......
Mercer v. Fritts, 236 Kan. 73, 74, 689 P.2d 774, 775 (1984) (Prager, J., concurring).
Development in the area of landlord-tenant law closely parallels the trend in the law of
premises liability and expresses the same social policy concerns. For example, many exceptions
have recently been made to the traditional common law rule that the lessor had no liability to
the tenant or others for defective conditions existing at the time of the lease. PROSSER &
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Indeed, the common law categories bear no logical relationship to the
exercise of reasonable care for the safety of others. Under the common law
rules, the owner was expected to use reasonable care to maintain the premises
for an invitee, but not for a social guest. Certainly, the presence of the
social guest who is invited to the owner's premises is as predictable, if not
more so, than the presence of the business visitor." 7 Moreover, both the
social guest and the invitee have legitimate expectations that the owner, who
has requested or consented to their visit, will exercise reasonable care for
their safety.
Consideration must also be given to the the owner's position in relation
to the premises. The owner, and not the entrant, has the greater opportunity,
incentive, and capacity to maintain the condition of the premises and guard
against the risk of injury to the entrant. The appropriate inquiry is whether
the burden of guarding against the risk of injury to the entrant and the
expense of taking such precautions is greater or less than the risk of harm
to the entrant. If the burden on the owner is less than the risk of injury to
the entrant, then the imposition of a duty upon the owner for the benefit
of the entrant is reasonable.' 5"
Accordingly, one must ask whether the common law scheme has lost its
ability to reflect contemporary community values and expectations.' 59 Ap-
KEETON, supra note 1, at 434-46. In this regard, consider the approach of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). In Sargent, the court
abandoned the traditional landlord's immunity and imposed, instead, a duty of reasonable care
not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm. See Love, Landlord's Liability For
Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability? 1975 Wis. L. REV. 19
(advocating the Sargent approach). The Sargent approach was rejected in Illinois in Dapkunas
v. Cagle, 42 III. App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (5th Dist. 1976). More recently, however, other
jurisdictions have shown a willingness to follow New Hampshire's lead. See, e.g., Mansur v.
Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1981); Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E.2d 1045
(1980); Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 (1979).
157. Harper, Laube v. Stevenson: A Discussion, 25 CONN. B.J. 123, 132 (1951).
158. This is merely an application of the negligence formula articulated by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge Hand
proposed that duty is a function of three variables that can be expressed in an algebraic formula
where B is the burden of taking precautions against the risk of injury, P is the probability that
the injurious condition is likely to occur, and L is the gravity of the resulting injury. Thus,
Hand suggested that duty depends upon whether B < P x L. Id. at 173.
159. "Why in common reason should a person invited for the occupier's pleasure be worse
off than one who is about business concerning both?" P. LANDON, POLLOCK'S LAW OF TORTS
408 (15th ed. 1951). As one court suggested, "To state the question is to answer it. There is
no good reason .... Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 854, 236 N.W.2d 1, 10
(1975).
In an effort to bring the law of premises liability into accord with the legitimate expectations
of the parties and contemporary community standards, the Illinois courts have periodically
introduced changes into the law by reclassifying entrants or making exceptions to the common
law rules. See supra notes 40-71 and accompanying text. Proceeding piecemeal tends to increase
confusion, however, because of the lingering adherence to traditional nomenclature and because
of the legal fictions that frequently arise, for example, that the frequent trespasser has the
owner's permission. As Professors Harper and James suggest, while this pattern of change
marks the transition to new rules, change by exception distorts the transitional process and
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parently, the Illinois General Assembly has answered that question affirm-
atively. The enactment of the Premises Liability Act by the General Assembly
represented a significant policy judgment: It is desirable to impose upon the
property owner the duty to use reasonable care under all the circumstances
for the safety of those rightfully on the owner's premises.
Furthermore, the common law status categories have the effect of keeping
modern values, policies, and mores out of the law of premises liability.
Changing social conditions are expected to lead to modifications in an
individual's duty toward others. 6° This is due to the elasticity of the rea-
sonable conduct standard applied in negligence cases. Negligence law does
not posit definite rules in advance for every combination of circumstances
that may arise. Instead, the jury is expected to examine whether the defend-
ant's conduct was that of a reasonable person under the circumstances.
Importantly, this approach achieves a community-oriented evaluation of the
defendant's conduct. ' 6'
The common law rules, on the other hand, frequently resulted in the
judge's resolution of the issue of the owner's liability as a matter of law.
Hence, cases were often dismissed at the pleading stage and summarily
removed from the jury's consideration. 62 Accordingly, the common law rules
detracts from the proper inquiry. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at 1468. Assuming
arguendo that the law's objective is to impose liability for unreasonably dangerous conduct,
query whether there has been "permission" or "invitation" overshadows the proper consider-
ation of the probability of the entrant's presence and of harm to them. Id. at 1468-69.
160. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 359. A court will, at least in theory, find a duty
on the part of an individual where a reasonable person would acknowledge that one exists. Id.
161. Id. at 173-75. This is most explicitly seen in the concept of the "reasonable man of
ordinary prudence," the fictitious person against whom the defendant's conduct theoretically
will be measured. The "reasonable man" has all of the qualities, including weaknesses, that
the community will tolerate; it is a "personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior
determined by the jury's social judgment." Id. at 175.
162. See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973) ("Harshness results because the essential task of judging a
landowner's conduct under prevailing community standards is removed from the province of
the jury"); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 2d 537, 543, 489 P.2d 308, 312 (1971)
("In Colorado, determination, without benefit of jury, has been the rule rather than the
exception"); Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 252-54, 384 A.2d 76, 84-85 (1978)
(Levine, J., dissenting) (common law rules deprive plaintiff of a jury determination of the
reasonableness of landowner's conduct); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 706-07, 297 N.E.2d
43, 51 (1973) (status question often prevents jury from determining basic question of the
reasonableness of the owner's actions); Comment, Torts-Negligence-Premises Liability: The
Foreseeable Emergence of the Community Standard, 51 DEN. L.J. 145, 164-65 (1974) (plaintiff's
frequently deprived of "community-oriented evaluation of the defendant's conduct . . . because
judges would rule on duty as a matter of law").
In Latimer v. Latimer, 66 I11. App. 3d 685, 384 N.E.2d 107 (1st Dist. 1978), for instance,
the defendant's mother, a guest in his home, slipped on a loose section of carpeting placed in
a hallway and was injured when she fell down a flight of stairs. The evidence tended to show
that the loose section of carpeting blended with the existing carpeting, did not have finished
edges or customary foam backing, and was not tacked down in any way. Id. at 687, 384 N.E.2d
at 108. Further, the defendants testified that they had knowledge of the hazard. Id. The
defendants moved for a directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff was a social guest, and
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had the very real potential to absolve the owner of liability for injury to the
entrant despite the fact that community standards might compel the opposite
conclusion. The Illinois Premises Liability Act imposes a uniform duty on
the part of the owner to exercise reasonable care and will provide greater
opportunity for the application of community standards by the lay jury. 63
C. Predictability and Stability
A strong argument in favor of the common law trespasser-licensee-invitee
rules can be made, because these rules lend predictability to the law of
premises liability. 64 Undoubtedly, the benefit of any rigid, mechanical rule
of law is that the outcome is predetermined. Under the common law ap-
proach, the court need only consider the status of the injured entrant to
determine the corresponding duty of the owner. This leads to established,
predictable allocations of liability. One must weigh, however, the benefit of
predictability against the burden of an unjust result.'65 Predictability has
little value within a system of rules that obscures the relevant circumstances
and precludes the application of community standards because of the primary
concern for the plaintiff's status.161
Similarly, it has been suggested that the common law approach is more
predictable for landowners as well, affording them some measure of insight
into their responsibility to entrants even before they enter the premises. 167
This argument is weak for three reasons. First, it presumes that the average
therefore the defendants had no duty to maintain the premises safe for the plaintiff. Id. at
688, 384 N.E.2d at 108. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, taking the case
from the jury. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case for consideration of whether
the carpet remnant could have been a known hidden danger of which the defendant had a duty
to warn. Id. at 689, 384 N.E.2d at 109.
163. The question remains, however, whether the increased role of the jury will open the
door to potentially unlimited liability for the owner of premises. See infra notes 176-201 and
accompanying text.
164. One commentator defended the mechanical common law rules based on the function of
the legal system to resolve and prevent disputes and the law's need to "create and impose its
own comparatively rigid categories on the phenomena which it seeks to control." Payne, The
Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MOD. L. REV. 359, 373 (1958).
165. Certainly, the common law status rules can lead to capricious results that do not
adequately reflect the need to impose liability upon the owner. Thus, in two substantially
identical cases a strict application of the common law rules produces an eggregious result.
Compare Abbs v. Rob Roy Country Club, Inc., 337 Ill. App. 591, 86 N.E.2d 412 (lst Dist.
1949) with Krantz v. Nichols, II Ill. App. 2d 37, 135 N.E.2d 816 (4th Dist. 1956), both
involving an injury to a youngster riding upon the back of a tractor with the knowledge of the
driver. See also Walton v. Norphlett, 56 Ill. App. 3d 4, 371 N.E.2d 978 (Ist Dist. 1977) (dinner
guest who stepped onto broken concrete stair and was injured in fall denied recovery); Helfenbein
v. Malzahn, 24 I1. App. 3d 616, 321 N.E.2d 394 (1st Dist. 1974) (social guest who stepped
into hole in owner's driveway denied recovery).
166. See supra notes 162-63.
167. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
105 (1968) (Burke, J., dissenting); see also Recent Decision, Torts/Premises Doctrine, 69 ILL.
B.J. 582, 583 (1981) ("[The] landowner can know his responsibilities to an entrant before the
person sets foot on the possessor's property").
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owner knows the common law status rules and has an understanding of the
consequent protection the law affords to the various categories of entrants.
Undoubtedly, this overstates the knowledge of a majority of society. ' 68
Nevertheless, in theory people are presumed to know the law and, thus,
the consequences of their actions. Despite this imputed knowledge, the
predictability argument requires a further assumption. This argument im-
plicitly assumes that the average landowner is likely to reflect on a visitor's
common law status to determine the extent of responsibility owed to the
visitor. Inasmuch as the visitor's status is based upon the foreseeability of
the visit, this may well be true. The average owner, however, looks to what
can be done to improve the condition of the premises rather than to what
responsibilities can be avoided.'69 Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary
their conduct based upon whether someone has come onto their premises
for a social, as opposed to a business, purpose. 70
Finally, the predictability argument assumes that an owner will no longer
be able to forecast potential liability under the reasonableness standard of
the new Illinois approach. In this regard, one must not overlook the fact
that under general negligence principles, the law rarely sets forth hard and
fast rules for a citizen's duty." Negligence theory, however, provides a
measure of predictability because the court will later ask whether the owner
acted as a reasonable and prudent person would have acted under the
circumstances. Notwithstanding that it is applied by the jury in hindsight,
the reasonable person standard approximates the common sense judgment
and intuition of the owner more closely than the rigid common law rules.
Additionally, because the reasonable conduct standard is a community stand-
168. See Comment, Torts-Landowner's Liability-Traditional Distinctions Between Tres-
passers, Licensees, and Invitees Abolished as Determinative of the Standard of Care Owed a
Visitor, 25 ALA. L. REV. 401, 410 (1973) ("In most jurisdictions the law of landowner's liability
is far from certain or predictable; it has become a complex, confusing, and self-contradictory
area").
169. Moreover, the law of premises liability should seek to encourage this distinction.
Imposing an affirmative duty upon owners to use reasonable care under the circumstances for
all entrants accomplishes this task. The common law status rules, however, frustrate this
purpose.
170. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104
(1968). It is absurd to imagine residential owners, for instance, pausing to ask themselves
whether their visitor has come upon the land with an implied invitation or whether they have
some mutually beneficial interest, so that the owner will be alerted to exercise reasonable care
to make the premises safe. Reason and intuition dictate that the average person is more likely
to consider the probability of the visitor's presence and the condition of the premises. Thus, a
standard of reasonable care based on foreseeability of harm more closely approximates the
owner's expectations.
171. This aspect of general negligence theory has traditionally caused confusion. "Aside from
those few cases where duties have been stated in terms of conduct, the duty a defendant was
under, or the protection a plaintiff was entitled to have, is unknowable until the case has been
adjudged." Green, supra note 4, at 1025. This flexibility, however, is desirable. It is impossible
to foresee all possible combinations of conduct that may arise. Further, assuming that this was
accomplished, it would be equally impossible to maintain such a body of rules in a constantly
changing environment.
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ard, it derives some semblance of certainty from the social values and mores
of the owner's community while providing the flexibility needed in the law.' 72
The predictability and stability afforded by the common law classifications
is questionable for other reasons, as well. Consideration must be given to
the nature of the predictability gained from a rigid rule structure. Essentially,
it is predictability in the sense of who will win, not in the sense of a fair
result.' - In fact, the trespasser-licensee-invitee rules only serve to obscure
the answer to an important question: What precautions does society require
of owners for the safety of those entering the premises?'7 4 There is no
predictability in such an analysis. There is only the illusion of predictability.
Admittedly, the Illinois Premises Liability Act may result in some loss of
certainty in these cases. It is difficult to say, however, that the common law
approach, with its numerous exceptions,'75 provided a high degree of pre-
dictability for the landowner or the judge at common law. Furthermore,
there is little merit in the nature of the predictability provided by the common
law status rules. Therefore, there is no cause to believe that the Act will
usher in an era of unpredictable confusion and instability in the law of
premises liability.
D. The Role of the Judge and Jury
The Illinois Premises Liability Act will presumably allow more cases to
reach a jury on the issue of the reasonableness of the owner's conduct than
under the prior law.', The common law scheme had the effect of taking a
large percentage of cases away from the jury's consideration. ' The defenders
of the common law categories do not, however, favor an increase in jury
involvement. Elimination of the explicit status rules, it is argued, will cause
confusion in the jury box. 7 Jurors will be unable to properly balance the
172. See supra note 161.
173. Comment, Loss of the Land Occupier's Preferred Position-Abrogation of the Common
Law Classifications of Trespasser, Invitee, Licensee, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 449, 456 (1969)
("Judicial emphasis on predictability, when over-emphasized, is abhorrent to our system of
case by case analysis to legal problems. Predictability in the sense of who wins the law suit
[sic] becomes separable from predictability in the sense of a fair result, and the former becomes
master and the latter servant.").
174. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND.
L.J. 467, 511 (1976) (the author poses the same question).
175. See supra notes 39-70 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Indeed, the control over the imposition of
liability exercised by the judge is acknowledged as one of the guiding factors in the development
of the common law status rules. Marsh, supra note 17, at 185-86.
When the common law categories were created, "judges found that by classifying the persons
into various classes they could more effectually control the power of the jury. The more classes,
the more necessity of defining those classes, the more 'duties' to be determined ...and thus
the fewer cases to be sent to a jury ...." Green, supra note 25, at 272 n.56.
178. Henderson argues that the reason for this confusion is the "special relationship" between
the owner and the entrant. Henderson, supra note 174, at 512-13. The suggestion is that, unlike
other situations where the actors are at arm's length, there is a need to define the contours of
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complex factors that are required to reach an appropriate verdict.' 79 This
argument ignores the jury's role under the common law approach and in
other negligence cases. In these cases, juries have been entrusted with the
function of assessing the defendant's conduct in light of the circumstances
in order to reach a verdict. In negligence cases, the only determination that
the jury generally does not make is the existence of a duty."" Presumably,
juries have accomplished their task with a high degree of success.' 8 '
Apparently, the concern over an increase in jury involvement under the
Premises Liability Act exposes a more serious fear in the legal community.
Introducing a single standard of reasonable care into the law of premises
liability may result in too much control by the lay jury over these cases."82
Under the Act, the door to the jury room is opened wider than it had
previously been for licensees. Thus, the abolition of the licensee-invitee
distinction in Illinois will understandably create concern. Some practitioners
the relationship between owner and entrant. Id. at 513. Thus, the jury will be unable to give
meaning and effect to the owner-entrant relationship "on a case by case basis, guided only by
common sense and intuition." Id. Perhaps, however, it is better that the jury determine the
special values and priorities that exist in the owner-entrant relationship in response to contem-
porary community standards.
179. See, e.g., Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 243, 352 N.E.2d 868, 874, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564,
569-70 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring) (under reasonable conduct standard "no guidance is
offered courts or juries for particular cases or classes of cases"); Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d
691, 695 (Fla. 1973) (reasonable conduct standard is too vague to apply to landowner because
of inherent distinctions in the relationships between owners and entrants, and cannot "suffi-
ciently afford a reasonable standard which can be applied as a measure by the jury").
One court summarized the concern as follows:
Can a lay jury reasonably be expected to consider the proper relative effect of
natural and artificial conditions on the premises which are or may be dangerous,
the degree of danger inherent in such conditions, the extent of the burden which
should be placed on the possessor of premises to alleviate the danger, the nature,
use and location of the condition or the force involved, the foreseeability of the
presence of the plaintiff on the premises, the obviousness of such dangerous
condition or the plaintiff's actual knowledge of the condition or force which resulted
in injury?
Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446, 450, 576 P.2d 593, 597 (1978).
180. See infra text accompanying note 186.
181. Support for the jury's performance can be seen in H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966), a much acclaimed social scientific analysis of jury functioning, con-
cluding that, overall, jurors understand the case, id. at 158, follow the evidence, id. at 161-62,
and arrive at the same conclusion as the judge in more than 75 percent of the cases. Id. at 56.
See also Joiner, From The Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
145 (R. Simon ed. 1975); Corboy, From The Bar, Id., in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL OVERVIEW 181.
Apparently, England has virtually discarded the use of a jury in negligence actions altogether.
Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446, 450, 576 P.2d 593, 597 (1978). The United States, however,
has yet to make any substantial change in the role of the lay jury in negligence cases.
182. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 121, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
105 (1968) (Burke, J., dissenting) (fearing imposition of unlimited liability); 12 DUQ. L. REV.
972, 980 (1974) ("flooded courts and unjustified recoveries may be envisioned"); Schofield v.
Merrill, 386 Mass. 244, 435 N.E.2d 339 (1982) (concerned for jury's role if trespasser status
was abolished).
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may fear that a mere proof of injury, combined with the ability of the owner
to bear the burden of liability, will move the jury toward a verdict on behalf
of the injured entrant. Still, such fears appear particularly unfounded. An
examination of the allocation of judge and jury functions under general
negligence law, and the available research in this area, indicate that reason-
able limits on owners' liability are likely to be retained. 8
The general negligence formula provides a flexible system for the allocation
of decisional functions between the judge and jury.'84 Simply speaking, two
broad allocations are made. The trial judge determines the issues of law,
while all factual questions raised by the litigation will be subject to the jury's
discretion. 8 ' Thus, based on the pleadings submitted by the parties, the
judge will first determine whether a duty does in fact exist-a purely legal
question." 6 If the judge determines that the defendant does owe the plaintiff
a duty, the case will proceed to the jury for a determination of whether the
defendant was negligent and, if so, the extent of the plaintiff's injury. On
the other hand, if the judge decides that the particular defendant did not
owe the plaintiff a duty, the action will be dismissed.' 7
This basic allocation functions to control the limits of liability. For
example, in Boyd, as previously mentioned,' the plaintiff brought a wrong-
ful death action against the owner of the currency exchange. The action
sought to impose liability upon the owner for failing to accede to a criminal's
demands during an attempted robbery. 89 The appellate court recognized that
because Boyd was a business invitee, the owner owed him the duty to use
reasonable care for his protection while on the premises.' 90 The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, held that this duty did not extend to the risk that
an invitee may be injured by the refusal to honor a criminal's demands.' 9'
183. See infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
184. Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation of
Judge and Jury Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 15, 21.
185. Green, supra note 2, at 375.
186. PROssER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 236.
187. The discussion in the text is likely to be confusing to those who are unfamiliar with the
law of negligence. To clarify, it should be noted that negligence theory imposes upon each
person, for the benefit of others, the duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances not
to injure others by their unintentional acts. This recognizes, in a broad sense, that the interest
of some persons are given protection against the acts of others. See Green, supra note 4, at
1025. This, however, does not set forth the particular interests that are protected, the degree
of protection, or the specific requirements needed to fulfill this duty. Id. In each particular
case the judge must determine these questions, albeit in hindsight. When the judge permits the
case to go to the jury on the issue of negligence, the judge is deciding, implicitly or explicitly,
that the duty that the law imposes extends to the particular risks involved in the case. See
Green, supra note 2, at 378 ("Duties are based on policies which enable a court to exclude or
include the risks of injury sought to be brought under the protection of the particular duty
owed the victim)". The risk of injury, given the facts, circumstances, and policies applicable to
the case, must come within the protective umbrella of the defendant's duty to the victim. Id.
188. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
190. Boyd, 8 111. App. 3d 140, 143-44, 289 N.E.2d 219, 221 (lst Dist. 1972).
191. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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As a matter of law, the owner had no duty to accede to the robber's
demands. 9 2 The power to control the "duty question" is apparent. The
Boyd court precluded any consideration of the owner's conduct by a jury.
The exercise of this discretionary power gives the court the ability to delineate
the various risks against which owners must protect their entrants. In this
way, the judge-jury allocation functions to control the limits of owners'
liability.
The basic allocation of judge and jury functions serves to illuminate the
importance of the duty concept in negligence cases. Yet, other control
mechanisms are available as well. Professors Prosser and Keeton, for ex-
ample, point to three additional ways in which the judge has the ability to
control the imposition of liability.' 93 First, the judge may determine that the
facts are insufficient as a matter of law to establish the existence of negli-
gence.' 94 Moreover, the general standard of conduct is a matter of law to
be applied by the court. Thus, the judge typically controls this issue by
means of instructing the jury.' 9 Finally, the court may remove the case from
the jury by finding that reasonable minds could not differ with respect to
whether the defendant's conduct did or did not conform to what the com-
munity requires. 96 Hence, it is clear that general negligence theory makes
ample provision for the judge's control over the decisional process.
Those who fear the increased role of the jury under the Illinois Premises
Liability Act assume that these control provisions in the general negligence
formula cannot or will not be applied to retain practical limits on an owner's
liability. This assumption, however, is unsupported by the available evidence.
For example, a 1981 study concerned with the question of jury control
examined the decisions that had accumulated in the jurisdictions abolishing
the status categories.197 The researchers concluded that the disposition of the
cases was apparently consistent with the handling of negligence cases gen-
erally. 19 Moreover, the results tended to support the abolition of the common
law categories as the means of determining the owner's duty to an entrant. 99
192. See id.
193. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note I, at 235.
194. Id. at 236.
195. Id. The extent of the judge's control will vary with the formulation of the jury
instructions. As one commentator notes, "[a] particular court's instructions, by attaching
unusual significance to the circumstances of entry, could disproportionately enhance the im-
portance of common-law entrant status in relation to other relevant circumstances, thereby
vitiating the effect of the general standard of reasonable care under the circumstances."
Comment, Abrogation of Common-Law Entrant Classes, supra note 154, at 638.
196. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 237.
197. See Hawkins, supra note 184, at 22.
198. Id. at 56.
199. Id. at 58. Hawkins found that 30 of 80 cases were withheld from juries by directed
verdicts or other summary dispositions. Id. at 53. In the 30 cases withheld from juries, this
was apparently due to what Hawkins calls the "risk situation," meaning the nature of the risk
involved in relation to who created the risk. In the cases that were withheld, there was a higher
frequency of risks over which the parties had little or no control, such as, third-party hazards,
natural condition hazards, and bizarre events, and a higher incidence of risks that the plaintiff
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The research suggests that the majority of cases examined would have been
resolved the same under the common law approach. 2  Importantly, however,
the use of the general standard of reasonable care increased the probability
that meritorious cases would not be summarily dismissed solely on the basis
of the plaintiff's status.2""
Despite the probability that the decisionmaking function is likely to be
shifted to the lay jury, the apprehension that the abolition of the common
law status rules will result in unlimited liability for landowners is unwar-
ranted. Indeed, the general negligence formula provides ample opportunities
for the court to set the limits of liability. Furthermore, this approach has
two advantages over the common law status rules. First, a general standard
of reasonable conduct eliminates the need for the court to deny the existence
of a duty simply on the basis of the plaintiff's status. Therefore, the judge
has more flexibility to allow meritorious claims to reach the jury, while still
retaining ample control over the limits of liability. Second, as more claims
reach the jury on the issue of the owner's conduct, there is a greater
opportunity for the application of community standards to the law of
premises liability.
E. The Borderline Cases: Confusion v. Injustice
Critics of the trespasser-licensee-invitee rules argue that a single standard
of reasonable care in all circumstances will lessen the confusion that accom-
panies the traditionally strict adherence to the common law scheme.2"2 Ap-
may have had an opportunity to anticipate or control, such as, common and obvious conditions,
or plaintiff's own risky conduct. Id. at 55. Conversely, in those cases that reached juries there
was a higher frequency of dangers resulting from the defendant's actions and hidden or latent
conditions. Id. Additionally, Hawkins suggests that one must consider the court's assessment
of the magnitude of the risk, the gravity of the harm, the burden of prevention, and the like.
Id. at 55-56.
200. Id. at 58. A similar, though not as formal, analysis of post-repudiation cases supports
the results of the Hawkins' study in this regard. See Comment, supra note 168, at 413-14 (if
analyzed under the traditional approach, plaintiffs would have been placed within the excep-
tions).
201. Hawkins, vupra note 184, at 57-8. Hawkins notes that in a substantial number of cases
the repudiation of the status rules produced both differences in the allocation of judge and
jury functions, and potential differences in the outcome on the merits. Id. A closer examination
of the facts of these cases, Hawkins found, tended to support the new trend in the law.
Additionally, if one is to assess the impact of the greater role that the jury is likely to have
under the Illinois Premises Liability Act, one must consider the strengths of the lay jury within
our legal system. One such advantage is the application of community standards to the law of
premises liability. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. "Arguably, a jury in its
collective wisdom is better equipped than any single judge to represent community standards."
Comment, supra note 162, at 165. The concept of "community justice," which takes into
account the greater acceptance of the law through community involvement, is also beneficial.
See P. DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 21-39 (1984).
202. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959)
("[Elven within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and sub-classifications bred by the
common law have produced confusion and conflict"); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699, 702
(Tenn. 1984) ("today the law is a complex patchwork of legal classifications which are by no
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parently, the application of the traditional scheme itself has not confused
the courts. Based upon the facts of the case, the suing plaintiff can almost
always be placed within one of the three broad categories. Confusion arises,
however, when courts attempt to arrive at a just result under the circum-
stances while limited by the confines of these antiquated rules." 3
An examination of the social guest cases in Illinois as they have developed
under the common law exemplifies the potential for confusion. Recall that
under the common law approach social guests were no better off than
licensees, no matter how cordially they were invited on the premises by the
owner. 20 4 Thus, owners did not have a duty to use reasonable care to make
the premises safe for their social guests. Accordingly, the social guest was
expected to accept the condition of the premises without complaint.
These principles were applied by the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District in Ciaglo v. Ciaglo.21 15 In Ciaglo, the plaintiff was visiting her son,
the defendant, on his farm. While visiting her son, she attended to some of
the usual housekeeping and farm chores. No payment was mentioned for
her assistance, and none was expected to be exchanged by either party." 6
The plaintiff sued when she was injured in a fall from a ladder while picking
plums. 2°17 The court refused to reverse a directed verdict on behalf of the
defendant based on the trial court's finding that the plaintiff was a social
means uniformly interpreted in the various jurisdictions"); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d
746, 749 (N.D. 1977) (one reason for abandoning the status rules is that "the many exceptions
and distinctions make the use of the common law categories complex, confusing, inequitable,
and, paradoxically, nonuniform"); Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 732
(Alaska 1977) (noting the subtleties and refinements of the common law rules); Comment, A
Re-examination Of The Land Possessor's Duty To Trespassers, Licensees, And Invitees, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 332, 348 (1969) (the modification of existing tests "causes confusion and
complexity without attaining a workable approach to the problem of determining the duty of
the land possessor").
203. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117-18, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103
(1968). The difficulty with the status rules is clear when one considers that they form a
continuum based on the foreseeability of the entrant, with the trespasser being the most
unforeseeable plaintiff and the invitee being, theoretically, the most foreseeable. Comment,
supra note 162, at 160-61. The problem arises that the presence of all entrants within the same
class is not equally foreseeable. Id. at 161. For instance, the social guest expressly invited to
the premises is likely to be more foreseeable than the licensee who comes to the premises with
the implied invitation of the owner. Applying a uniform duty to all members of a particular
class runs counter to the principles of general negligence theory. While foreseeability increases
gradually, with some exceptions, the corresponding duty increases in discrete steps. Id. Thus,
in the previous example, the common law rules posit that the court contemplated the development
of a "neurosis domicilia," and visualized signs in homes saying "Enter at your own risk," or
"Examine each chair." Id. Hunter v. Alfina, 112 Il1. App. 2d 432, 436-7, 251 N.E.2d at 303,
306 (1st Dist. 1969). This extreme position, however, is apparently not borne out by the
evidence, see supra note 200 and accompanying text, or by common sense.
204. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
205. 20 Ill. App. 2d 360, 156 N.E.2d 376 (Ist Dist. 1959).
206. Id. at 364, 156 N.E.2d at 378.
207. Id. at 365, 156 N.E.2d at 378. A young cow had bumped the ladder. The plaintiff
argued that the defendant had a duty to warn her of the propensity of young cows to bump
into objects, a fact known to the defendant.
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guest.2'9 In its decision, the appellate court relied on the common law
principle that incidental tasks performed for the host's benefit by the guest
do not modify the entrant's status as a licensee." 9
More recently, however, some Illinois courts seem to be willing to find
that under similar circumstances such a guest may be entitled to the protection
afforded the common law invitee. In Madrazo v. Michaels,2'" for example,
the plaintiff went to live with her niece to help her move into a new home
and care for her children. While carrying some clothing down a stairway,
she stepped into a misplaced box, fell, and consequently was injured. 2 ' The
First District reversed a directed verdict in favor of the defendants. The
court held that, although no mention was made of renumeration for her
services, the plaintiff was an invitee and not a social guest.2'
2
Similarly, in Drews v. Mason,2 3 the plaintiff went to her daughter's home
to aid in cleaning up and repairing the house after a recent fire. The plaintiff
was injured when she slipped on a curtain rod that had been left on the
floor.2 4 As in Madrazo, there was no offer or promise of payment to the
plaintiff, and the only benefit she could have received was her own satis-
faction. Indeed, the plaintiff had taken the obligation upon herself. 5 The
Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District held that the jury could
properly find that the plaintiff was an invitee. 216 Thus, while the plaintiff in
Ciaglo was performing substantially the same services as the plaintiffs in
Madrazo and Drews, under much the same conditions, only in the former
was the plaintiff considered a social guest who was unable to recover for
the defendant's negligence in maintaining the premises.
Madrazo and Drews represent a more eqUitable approach than would have
resulted under a strict application of the common law rules. Nonetheless,
the confusion that is created is obvious. If the common law status rules were
still in force today, these Illinois decisions leave too many unanswered
questions and too little guidance for other courts. It is unlikely that the
decisions rest upon whether the guest has been asked to assist in the home.
In Drews, for example, there was no request by the defendant that the
208. Id. at 366, 156 N.E.2d at 380.
209. Id. at 366, 156 N.E.2d at 379.
210. 111l. App. 3d 583, 274 N.E.2d 635 (1st Dist. 1971).
211. Id. at 585, 274 N.E.2d at 637.
212. Id. at 587-88, 274 N.E.2d at 639. The court purportedly applied an invitation test. The
court stated that "the status of an invitee does not depend on whether the invited person is to
gain an economic advantage or benefit from his entry . I..." d. at 587, 274 N.E.2d at 638.
This was, however, in contradiction to the court's definition of an invitee as including "a
mutuality of benefit or a benefit to the owner." Additionally, it is clear from the court's
opinion that the court sought to find something other than the benefit of hospitality, diversion,
or enjoyment.
213. 29 111. App. 2d 269, 172 N.E.2d 383 (3d Dist. 1961).
214. Id. at 272, 172 N.E.2d at 385. The plaintiff had not performed any work on the day
of the accident. Id. at 276, 172 N.E.2d at 385.
215. Id. at 273, 172 N.E.2d at 386. The defendant had never explicitly asked her mother,
the plaintiff, to help. Id. at 273, 172 N.E.2d at 386.
216. Id. at 277-78, 172 N.E.2d at 387.
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plaintiff assist with the housework, but the court held that the plaintiff was
an invitee nonetheless. 2 7
Likewise, it is questionable whether the imposition of greater liability in
the Drews and Madrazo cases rested upon the plaintiff-guest's activities while
on the premises.2 If this is so, both courts failed to state how much activity
would be enough to distinguish between a social guest and an invitee.
Perhaps, alternatively, the decisions were based upon the fact that the guests
were active visitors as opposed to passive callers. If this is indeed the case,
little justification exists for affording more protection to the guest who
performs incidental tasks than one who has come on the invitation of the
owner simply for enjoyment or diversion." 9
Critics strongly oppose the common law approach because of this potential
for confusion.22 Clearly, it would be unjust to deny an injured entrant
recompense merely because the entrant was not on the premises for a business
purpose. This is particularly true if the visitor's presence was foreseeable
and the burden of maintaining the premises was not onerous. Yet, by failing
to indicate the considerations that motivated their decisions, these Illinois
courts add materially to the uncertainty that surrounds the law of premises
liability. Furthermore, the defenders of the trespasser-licensee-invitee rules
stress the need for predictability and stability.' But, straining the rules in
order to reach the appropriate conclusion detracts from these virtues. Hence,
the common law rules, originating in a vastly different social order and
pock-marked by judicial refinements, caused increased confusion and com-
plexity. This confusion is, in part, remedied by the Illinois Premises Liability
Act.
F. The Trespasser Problem
Arguably, the weakness of the Premises Liability Act as enacted by the
Illinois General Assembly is that it does not effect a wholesale abandonment
217. See supra note 216.
218. The plaintiff in Drews had not yet performed any services on the day of the accident.
29 Ill. App. 2d 269, 276, 172 N.E.2d 383, 385 (3d Dist. 1961).
219. Both are justified in their expectation that the premises are reasonably safe for their
visit and that the owner will take reasonable steps not to injure them by their own acts.
Moreover, in either case, the foreseeability of the plaintiff's presence is the same, as is the
ability to be aware of dangers that may exist on the premises.
220. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. Likewise, other Illinois courts have occa-
sionally deviated from the traditional common law status rules. Compare Augsburger v. Singer,
103 Ill. App. 2d 12, 242 N.E.2d 635 (2d Dist. 1968) (plaintiff was invitee where he volunteered
to assist defendant in dismantling defendant's carnival display); Hamilton v. Faulkner, 80 11.
App. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 304 (4th Dist. 1967) (jury could find that tenant was an invitee when
he went on roof of apartment building to fix television aerial); and Bognovich v. Shermer, 16
111. App. 2d 197, 147 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist. 1958) (plaintiff was invitee where he answered
request for help in removing property from defendant's burning building, though with no
benefit to himself) with Krantz v. Nichols, I I 11. App. 2d 37, 135 N.E.2d 816 (4th Dist. 1956)
(demonstrating the traditional common law approach that one who comes onto premises to
volunteer assistance, although conferring a benefit, is no better off than a licensee).
221. See supra notes 164, 167 and accompanying text.
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of the common law status rules. The newly created distinction between those
rightfully and wrongfully on the premises is subject to criticism. The Premises
Liability Act eliminates the confusion and complexity incident to the licensee-
invitee distinction. The common law rules regarding trespassers, however,
are as troubled with exceptions and fictions as the other categories of the
tripartite common law scheme. The Act requires that the courts continue to
apply the status rules to distinguish the owner's duty toward the trespassing
entrant.
Retaining trespassers as a separate category perpetuates .he need to sep-
arate trespassers from rightful entrants and "good trespassers" from "bad
trespassers. '12 2 For example, as previously noted, trespassing children are
not subject to the wilful and wanton misconduct standard generally applicable
to all trespassers. Instead, child trespassers are owed the duty of reasonable
care by the owner if their presence and the risk of injury to them is known
or should be known by the owner. 2 1 Likewise, "discovered" trespassers are
owed the duty of reasonable care after they are found in a place where they
may be injured by the owner's negligence. 224 The difficulty with such an
approach is that it mitigates some of the results of the common law rule
without eliminating the rule itself. Instead of challenging the efficacy of the
common law trespasser status, the exceptions are created to try to fit modern
values into an archaic, rigid system. The law should require an owner to do
what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances for the safety
of entrants whom the owner knows or has reason to expect are on the
premises.
A reasonable conduct standard for the benefit of all entrants would proceed
from the premise that a duty of reasonable care is automatically owed to
each entrant. As Dean Prosser has noted, however, "[i]f the defendant could
not reasonably foresee any injury as the result of his act, or if his conduct
was reasonable in light of what he could anticipate, there is no negligence,
and no liability." '225 Certainly, a judge or jury would have little difficulty
applying such a standard to the very different situations of a customer on
commercial premises and a burglar in an owner's home. On the other hand,
the exceptions to the common law trespasser category only impose a duty
of reasonable care when the specific elements are met. Hence, if one element
is absent there is no need to assess the reasonableness of the owner's conduct.
Ultimately, the law of premises liability should have two objectives: to
impose liability for harm on unreasonably dangerous conduct, and to prompt
landowners to take precautions for the physical safety of others who may
enter on their land. If this is indeed the case, an approach that posits a duty
of reasonable care to all entrants is justified. Imposing an affirmative duty
upon owners to use reasonable care under the circumstances for all entrants
222. Oullette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976).
223. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
225. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 at 250 (4th ed. 1971).
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furthers these objectives. An unconditional rule of immunity for trespassers
gives owners a privilege to be careless. 2 6
Furthermore, consider the exceptions to the general limited-duty rule of
the common law trespasser category as they reflect the underlying nature of
the circumstances they encompass. All of the instances warranting exceptions
are circumstances in which the trespasser's presence is reasonably foreseeable
to the owner, and the risk of injury to the trespasser is great. 2 7 It becomes
apparent that these exceptions implicitly rely on factors that are inherent in
the general negligence formula. When considered in light of the ability of
general negligence theory to determine the owner's liability to licensees and
invitees, there is little reason not to believe that the same analysis can
adequately determine the owner's liability to the trespassing entrant as well.22
Of course, even without the status label the trespasser remains, in sub-
stance, an intruder. The landowner's responsibility to trespassers was first
denied because they were wrongful entrants. 229 It is not suggested, however,
that the landowner be responsible for trespassers in all instances. Yet, the
desirability of requiring owners to be highly respectful of human life, wher-
ever and however encountered, and the ability of owners to reduce the risk
of injury, is sufficient to warrant judgment in many cases. 230 If an owner
creates an unreasonable risk of harm and it is foreseeable that others may
be injured, the owner's liability should not be automatically denied simply
because the person injured is unexpected 23 ' or because that person is a
wrongdoer .232
By perpetuating the common law trespasser category, the Premises Liability
Act preserves, at least to some extent, the confusion and misdirection of the
common law trespasser-licensee-invitee scheme. There is little logic in sug-
gesting that the status of the entrants should be controlling if they are
trespassers, but should not be the guiding factor if they are lawful entrants. 233
226. Essentially, the Act "confers on an occupier of land a special privilege to be careless."
2. E. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at 1440.
227. See Comment, supra note 162, at 161.
228. See Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244, 254-59, 435 N.E.2d 339, 345-48 (1982) (Liacos,
J., dissenting).
229. Green, supra note 25, at 272.
230. The reasonable care standard would not impose a requirement upon owners to place
fences around their land, post conspicuous warnings in inconspicuous places, or patrol their
premises. "Instead, where the trespass is to be expected or where the burden would not be
unreasonable if steps were taken to warn of the hazard, the danger to the intruder outweighs
the imposition on the occupier." Comment, Liability Of A Land Occupier To Persons Injured
On His Premises: A Survey And Criticism Of Kansas Law, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 161, 175
(1969). In the latter situation, the owner would be expected to use reasonable care to remedy
the condition or warn of its existence. The duty would, understandably, be greater when the
condition results from the owner's active operations. Unlike the condition of the premises,
these operations are normally of short duration and are subject to spontaneous change.
Therefore, the burden of assuring the trespasser's safety is likely to be less. Id.
231. Green, supra note 25, at 274.
232. Comment, supra note 168, at 449, 457.
233. Denying recovery to trespassers because they are wrongfully on the premises ignores
altogether the culpability of the landowner. Comment, Torts-Abolition Of The Distinction
Between Licensees And Invitees Entitles All Lawful Visitors To A Standard Of Reasonable
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Our modern social policies favoring human safety and our humanitarian
values are in sharp contrast with this approach. 234 Finally, the general
negligence formula was created for cases such as these, defying uniformity
and requiring the widest range of judgment.2 35 Instead of directing this
change, the Illinois Premises Liability Act leaves these considerations to the
courts, which will undoubtedly move slowly toward developing a cohesive
doctrine of premises liability.
IMPACT
The abrogation of the common law licensee and invitee categories in
Illinois will have immediate procedural consequences. Under the reasonable
conduct standard established by the Premises Liability Act, the owner's duty
to those who would formerly have been licensees will no longer be determined
as a matter of law by the status rules. Consequently, more cases are likely
to proceed past the pleading stage, instead of being summarily disposed of
by the court.236 This will understandably lead to an increase in jury involve-
ment in the premises cases, promising that the owner's liability will more
closely reflect community standards. 217 But it is questionable whether there
Care, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 795, 809-10 (1974). The similarity between this notion and the
concept of contributory negligence is striking. In both, the plaintiff's conduct acts as an absolute
bar to recovery. Id. at 810. Illinois, however, has replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence
with the more equitable concept of comparative negligence. See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d I,
421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). Under comparative negligence principles, the parties are permitted to
recover the proportion of damages not attributable to their own fault. Id. at 16, 421 N.E.2d
at 892. The rule with respect to trespass is a unique exception to the idea of comparative
negligence. "It would be rather inconsistent for Illinois to retain the status of trespasser as a
complete defense rather than to make it just one factor in the comparison of fault." Davis v.
United States, 716 F.2d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1983).
234. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. The duty of care toward trespassers
would not necessarily be an unreasonable burden for the owner.
In the first place the duty not to be negligent is only a duty to take reasonable
precautions against undue risk of harm. Even if the possessor were to come under
the ordinary rule of negligence, therefore, he could always repel the obligation to
take any precautions he could show to be unreasonably burdensome.
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at 1437.
235. In the nearly 17 years since the first state repudiated the status rules, there has yet to
be any reports of uncontrolled jury verdicts in favor of trespassers. This is apparently due to
the jury control mechanism inherent in the general negligence formula. See supra note 199.
Explaining the impact of their repudiation of the common law rules on the status of trespasser,
one court noted:
When the intrusion is not foreseeable or is against the will of the landowner many
intruders will be denied recovery as a matter of law. In other words, a landowner
cannot be expected to maintain his premises in a safe condition for a wandering
tramp or a person who enters against the known wishes of the landowner.
Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976). The two statements, however, are
contradictory. It appears that what the court meant to say was that the landowner cannot be
expected to anticipate the presence/foreseeability of such persons. Thus, the specific conduct
that would satisfy the reasonable care standard would be minimal, at best.
236. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
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will be a significant increase in cases imposing liability upon the owner.
Increased jury involvement, considered in light of the greater likelihood that
meritorious claims will survive the pleading stage, suggests such a conclusion.
Apparently, however, this has not been the case in other jurisdictions that
have abolished the common law categories.23
The greatest impact of the Act can be expected in the social guest cases,
in which the application of the common law distinctions often produced an
illogical and unjust result. Under the common law the owner was not required
to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition for
social guests.13 9 This was true even when the guest's presence was particularly
foreseeable, as where the guest had been expressly invited by the owner.
Importantly, the reasonable conduct standard hereafter imposed upon the
owner for the benefit of all rightful entrants will lend the law of premises
liability the flexibility that is needed to deal with such cases. There is no
longer a need for the Illinois courts to determine whether the plaintiff is a
licensee or an invitee. Hence, recovery is no longer dependent upon the
existence of some economic relationship between the parties. This can be
expected to be significant only where it aids the court in determining the
foreseeability of the visitor's presence.
It is reasonable to expect that the Illinois Premises Liability Act will result
in a more economical use of judicial resources. Abolishing the common law
licensee and invitee classifications significantly reduces the need for time-
consuming litigation over the plaintiff's common law status. 4° Additionally,
fewer cases will be seen at the appellate level contesting the issue of the
plaintiff's status. This factor, coupled with the reluctance of counsel generally
to test the jury's verdict, can be expected to ultimately result in a higher
percentage of cases settled at earlier stages of the litigation process. The
likelihood that the landowner's liability will be less predictable under the
238. The results of the Hawkins study, supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text, however,
suggest that of the cases sampled in those iurisdictions that had abolished the status rules,
the outcome in a majority of the decisions would have been the same if the common law rules
had been applied. Therefore, while it is very likely that there will be an increase in cases
imposing liability, it is questionable whether this will be an extreme increase.
239. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
240. One Colorado case provides an excellent illustration of confusion and judicial waste.
In Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Smith, 92 Colo. 464, 21 P.2d 1116 (1933), the trial court
entered summary judgment for defendant on the basis of the plaintiff's common law status.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 465, 21 P.2d at
1117. On remand, the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff.
Id. On appeal, however, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed for errors in instructions and
ordered a new trial. Id. This time, however, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
directed verdict on the basis that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.
Id. On appeal the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and held that the plaintiff's evidence
was sufficient. Id. After another trial, the lower court entered judgment on the jury's verdict
in favor of the plaintiff. Id. Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Id.
at 469, 21 P.2d at i 118. Thus, the case was before the Colorado Supreme Court four times in
eight years as the result of the common law status rules. For the reports of these supreme court
decisions, see Windsor, 92 Colo. 464, 21 P.2d 1116 (1933); Windsor, 88 Colo. 422, 298 P. 646
(1931); Windsor, 82 Colo. 497, 261 P. 872 (1927); Windsor, 78 Colo. 169, 240 P. 332 (1925).
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Premises Liability Act than it appeared to be under the status rules can also
be expected to prompt an increase in settlements. Unfortunately, because
the Act leaves the trespasser category untouched, these cases will still be
dealt with as they were at common law.
Although the Illinois Premises Liability Act expressly abandons the com-
mon law licensee and invitee categories,24 ' the practitioner would do well to
retain an interest in the substantial body of case law relating to the common
law status rules. The duty imposed at common law for the benefit of the
invitee was that of reasonable care, the same standard imposed by the Act. 212
Further, the reasonable conduct standard requires a consideration of all the
circumstances in determining the owner's liability. Therefore, the circum-
stances of the entrant's presence will still remain a factor for consideration.
Consequently, the entrant's common law status, and the case law applicable
thereto, may provide the source of arguments regarding the likelihood of
injury and the foreseeability of the entrant's presence.243
The Premises Liability Act has the potential to introduce significant mod-
ifications into the law of premises liability. For example, the "natural
conditions rule" established at common law, protected landowners from
liability for injuries resulting from natural conditions on their land.2 44 The
natural conditions rule is unaffected by the Act. Recently, however, following
the new trend in the law of premises liability, some states have eliminated
this rule. In Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,2 45 for example,
the Michigan Supreme Court refused to apply the rule when a business
visitor slipped and fell on ice and snow in the defendant's parking lot. -2 4 6 No
affirmative acts of the owner had created or aggravated the hazard. 47 Still,
the Michigan Supreme Court held that the owner had a duty to exercise
241. See supra note II and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
243. For example, under the traditional approach, an invitation to transact business extended
not only to the portion of the premises where the transaction occurred, but also to all other
areas where it was reasonable for the visitor to believe the invitation extended. Pauckner v.
Wakem, 231 Ill. 276, 282, 83 N.E. 202, 205 (1907) The corollary of this principle was, logically,
that the invitee might lose the invitee status as such and become a licensee when the bounds
of the invitation were violated. ElIguth v. Blackstone Hotel Inc., 340 Ill. App. 587, 92 N.E.2d
502 (Ist Dist. 1950), aff'd, 408 Ill. 343, 348, 97 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1951); Avery v. Moews Seed
Corn Co., 131 Ill. App. 2d 842, 845-46, 268 N.E.2d 561, 564-65 (3d Dist. 1971); PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note I, at 424-25. Moreover, the same was said of the common law licensee
who went beyond the implied or express permission of the owner. Id. at 433. Consequently,
an understanding of the impact of such principles upon the common law scheme allows the
practitioner increased flexibility in arguing the presence or absence of a duty, or the foreseeability
of injury, to an entrant under the general negligence formula.
244. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
245. 395 Mich. 244, 235 N.W.2d 732 (1975). For a detailed review of the natural accumulation
rule, see Comment, Expansion of Landowner Liability Through Rejection of the Natural
Accumulation Rule, 61 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (1976).
246. On appeal, the record did not disclose any affirmative act by the defendant that increased
or aggravated the hazard.
247. 395 Mich. at 261, 235 N.W.2d at 740.
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reasonable care to diminish the hazard caused by the snow and ice. 248
Moreover, the court expressly stated that its holding was applicable to any
case involving an invitee.2 4 9
Quinlivan follows similar decisions in Alaska,2 5° New Mexico,2 5' and
Indiana.152 California has also recently joined this movement, holding that
landowners' liability for injuries resulting from natural conditions is based
on the duty to act reasonably with respect to their land. 25 Many other
jurisdictions have reached a similar result in cases involving defective trees
on the premises.
54
In Illinois, ironically, the rejection of the natural conditions rule seems to
have preceded this state's acceptance of the trend abolishing the trespasser-
licensee-invitee rules. In Mahurin v. Lockhart,2 5 the Illinois Appellate Court
for the Fifth District began to erode the traditional rule of immunity for
248. Id. at 260-61, 235 N.W.2d at 740. This requires "that reasonable measures be taken
within a reasonable time after an accumulation of ice and snow to diminish the hazard of
injury ...." Id. at 261, 235 N.W.2d at 740.
249. Id.
250. See Kremer v. Carr's Food Center, Inc., 462 P.2d 747 (Alaska 1969) (plaintiff fell on
unsalted, unscraped ice and snow in defendant supermarket's parking lot).
251. See Proctor v. Waxier, 84 N.M. 361, 503 P.2d 644 (1972) (landowner has duty to warn
or protect invitee against dangerous conditions created by ice and snow when condition is
unreasonably dangerous).
252. See Hammond v. Allegretti, 311 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 1974) (duty of reasonable care to
invitee was in no way diminished by natural accumulation of ice and snow).
253. See Sprecher v. Adamson Co's., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783
(1981); Comment, Torts-Liability Without Fault-The Beginning of the End of Immunity From
Landowner's Liability For Natural Conditions On His Land-Sprecher v. Adamson Co., 5
WHITTIER L. REV. 105 (1983); Casenote, Tort Liability: California Abolishes The Landowners
Immunity For Harm Outside The Premises Caused By Natural Conditions, 1983 So. ILL. U.L.J.
247.
254. See Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (an owner has a duty to
use reasonable care to protect passers-by on adjoining public ways from hazardous trees on
owner's land); Carver v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 8 Ariz. 513, 456 P.2d 371 (1969)
(where risk of injury from defective trees is unreasonable, owner has duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect others); Kurtigian v. City of Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 203 N.E.2d 692 (1965)
(plaintiff injured by falling' tree limb); Cornett v. Agee, 143 Ga. App. 55, 237 S.E.2d 522
(1977) (owner liable to adjoining owner when tree that was visibly defective fell into neighboring
yard); Rowe v. McGee, 5 N.C. App. 60, 168 S.E.2d 77 (1969) (regardless of natural growth,
owner had duty to eliminate danger of decayed tree on premises); Hay v. Norwalk Lodge,
B.P.O.E., 92 Ohio App. 14, 109 N.E. 2d 481 (1951) (plaintiff injured when portion of tree on
defendant's premises fell onto highway); Taylor v. Olsen, 282 Or. 343, 578 P.2d 779 (1978)
(owners have duty to inspect trees on their land and guard against unreasonable risk of injury
to others off the land); Barker v. Brown, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 75, 340 A.2d 566 (1975) (owner
subject to liability for harm to others off premises caused by defect in tree on premises if
owner failed to use reasonable care to inspect and repair); Fabbri v. Regis Forcier, Inc., 114
R.I. 207, 330 A.2d 807 (1975) (owners may be required to eliminate unsound tree on their land
regardless of fact that its condition was result of natural growth). But see Lemon v. Edwards,
344 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1961) (owner of densely wooded forest land had no duty to inspect trees
and therefore was not liable when tree fell on passing motorist); Albin v. Nat'l Bank of
Commerce of Seattle, 60 Wash. 2d 745, 375 P.2d 487 (1962) (duty of inspection for defective
trees does not extend to rural land).
255. 71 111. App. 3d 691, 390 N.E.2d 523 (5th Dist. 1979).
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the owner. The Mahurin court held that an owner would no longer be free
of liability for injuries to others off the premises resulting from a falling
tree located on the owner's land.21 6 Yet, Mahurin is still a minority position
in Illinois. It is not unreasonable, however, to suggest that the landowner
in Illinois will soon be expected to exercise reasonable care to protect others,
both on and off the premises, against injury from natural conditions of
which they have knowledge.2"'
Another area that may potentially be affected by the implementation of
the reasonable conduct standard for licensees and invitees is the liability of
the owner for the criminal acts of third parties.25 The Illinois courts have
proceeded cautiously in imposing liability on the owner in this area.259
Nevertheless, the trend toward imposing greater responsibility upon land-
owners to act reasonably with regard to their premises expresses an important
public policy. An owner's interest in land is no longer paramount to society's
interest in the safety of its members. This notion, quickly gaining acceptance
in Illinois and other jurisdictions, can be expected to influence the outcomes
in these cases. Thus, Illinois is likely to see an increase in cases stressing the
owner's responsibility to use reasonable efforts to guard entrants against the
criminal attacks of third parties.2 60
While the implications of the Illinois Premises Liability Act discussed
above are beneficial in their overall effect, their ultimate burden on the
256. Id. Thus, one would be justified in stating that, until today, occupiers owed a greater
duty to strangers off their land, with regard to the condition of their land, than they owed to
their social guests. Recent Decision, Torts/Premises Liability, 68 ILL. B.J. 676, 680 (1980).
257. Professors Prosser and Keeton recognize that the natural conditions rule is of question-
able validity in an urban society:
It remains to a considerable extent a necessity in rural communities, where the
burden of inspecting and improving the land is likely to be entirely disproportionate
not only to any threatened harm but even to the value of the land itself. But it is
scarcely suited to the cities, to say that a landowner may escape all liability for
serious damage to his neighbors, merely by allowing nature to take its course. A
different rule accordingly has been developing as to urban centers.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 391. In Gilberg v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 I11. App. 3d
554, 467 N.E.2d 947 (lst Dist. 1984), the court rejected the plaintiff's request that the natural
accumulation rule be abolished. In that case, the plaintiff was injured when he slipped on a
patch of ice in the defendant's parking lot. The court, however, noted that since the adoption
of comparative negligence, the Illinois courts are more closely comparing the conduct of the
plaintiff to that of the defendant. Id. at 558, 467 N.E.2d at 950 (citing Williams v. Alfred N.
Koplin & Co., 114 II1. App. 3d 482, 448 N.E.2d 1042 (2d Dist. 1983) and Kittle v. Liss, 108
Ill. App. 3d 922, 439 N.E.2d 972 (3d Dist. 1982)).
258. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
259. See id. But see Gordon v. Chicago Transit Auth., 128 II. App. 3d 493, 470 N.E.2d
1163 (lst Dist. 1984) (upholding jury's verdict in action charging carrier with responsibility to
use reasonable care to prevent rape which could reasonably have been foreseen and avoided).
260. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973), where the court abolished
the common law distinction between licensees and invitees in Massachusetts, has apparently
had a considerable impact on related issues. Subsequent decisions have increased the scope of
landlords' duty to their tenants, King v. G. & M. Realty Corp., 373 Mass. 658, 370 N.E.2d
413 (1977), the landowners' duty to their visitors, Lindsey v. Massios, 372 Mass. 79, 360 N.E.2d
631 (1977), and landowners' duty to the employees of independent contractors. Poirier v. Town
of Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 372 N.E.2d 212 (1978).
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owner remains speculative. For example, it is reasonable to expect that an
increase in lawsuits seeking to impose liability on owners will affect the cost
and, therefore, the availability of insurance. Any increase in the burden on
commercial owners is typically passed on to the public through higher prices.
Residential owners, however, are unable to distribute increases in insurance
costs and may be forced to reduce their coverage. Increases in insurance
costs will vary with the willingness to impose liability upon the landowner.26" '
Thus, the impact of the Premises Liability Act upon the cost and availability
of insurance is questionable. Moreover, while the average homeowner is
most likely to be in no greater financial position than an injured guest, the
potentially greater burden on the owner is justifiable. The landowner is in
a better position than the entrant to have knowledge of defects in the premises
and to avoid the risk of injury by either curing the defect or warning of its
existence .262
Owners can also be expected to bear the increased burden of maintaining
their premises in a reasonably safe condition. As with insurance, however,
it is reasonable to place the burden upon the individual who is in the best
position to guard against the risk of injury. If any particular class of owners
will bear a greater burden, it will likely be residential owners. Theoretically,
commercial owners are more accustomed than their residential counterparts
to anticipating the presence of the common law invitee. Contemporary
community standards of reasonableness, applied via traditional negligence
principles, guard against this result. What is reasonable conduct in one
context may be unreasonable in another. 263 Consequently, the conduct that
may reasonably be expected in a business establishment will differ from the
conduct expected in a residence.2 64 Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty
that landowners in Illinois will bear a measurably greater burden in making




The common law rules regarding trespassers, licensees, and invitees emerged
in an era when policies and values were far different than those of contem-
porary society. The difficulty of the common law approach to adequately
deal with societal changes is apparent. It is seen in the growing trend that
is imposing upon owners the duty to exercise reasonable care under all the
261. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
103-04 (1968).
262. It can hardly be said that the end result would be "an inhibition of social relations."
Recent Decision, Torts/Premises Doctrine, 69 ILL. B.J. 582, 585 (1981).
263. Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tenn. 1984).
264. Hunter v. Alfina, 112 II1. App. 2d 432, 436, 251 N.E.2d 303, 306 (1st Dist. 1969).
265. In Hunter, the court contemplated the development of a "neurosis domicilia," and
visualized signs in homes saying "Enter at your own risk," or "Examine each chair." Id. at
436-37, 251 N.E.2d at 306. This extreme position, however, is not borne out by the evidence,
see supra note 200 and accompanying text, or by common sense.
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circumstances for entrants on their premises. The passage of the Premises
Liability Act aligns Illinois with the twenty-one other jurisdictions that have
abandoned or modified the common law approach. Like these other juris-
dictions, Illinois has made a significant policy judgment, recognizing the
pre-eminent value of human safety over a landowner's freedom to act as
they please with regard to their property.
The Premises Liability Act abolishes the common law distinction between
licensees and invitees. In so doing, the Act promises to have a favorable
impact on the law of premises liability in Illinois. In addition to eliminating
much of the confusion and complexity existing under prior Illinois law, the
Act provides flexibility and ensures that the law will more accurately reflect
contemporary community values. It marks a transition in Illinois from a
rigid, fragmented methodology to a more comprehensive, uniform approach
to the determination of a landowner's liability for injury to others.
Despite its advantages, however, the Premises Liability Act falls short of
abolishing the common law trespasser status. Therefore, the benefits that
could potentially be gained from a single standard of reasonable care in all
cases are not fully realized. Indeed, the Act simply modifies the common
law rules to create two classes of entrants instead of three. This perpetuates
the categorical approach taken by the common law. It is hoped that the
policies behind the Premises Liability Act will encourage the courts to
complete the transition by eliminating the last remnant of the outmoded
trespasser-licensee-invitee trichotomy.
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